An integer programming Model for the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Couples

McBride, I. and Manlove, D. F. (2014) An integer programming Model for the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Couples. In: Operations Research Proceedings 2013: Selected Papers of the International Conference on Operations Research, OR2013. Series: Operations Research Proceedings. Springer International Publishing, pp. 293-299. ISBN 9783319070001 (doi:10.1007/978-3-319-07001-8_40)

[img]
Preview
Text
98265.pdf - Accepted Version

160kB

Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07001-8_40

Abstract

The Hospitals/Residents problem with Couples (hrc) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals/Residents problem (hr) that is important in practical applications because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. In this paper we give a new NP-completeness result for the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, in highly restricted instances of hrc. Further, we present an Integer Programming (IP) model for hrc and extend it the case where preference lists can include ties. Further, we describe an empirical study of an IP model for HRC and its extension to the case where preference lists can include ties. This model was applied to randomly generated instances and also real-world instances arising from previous matching runs of the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme, used to allocate junior doctors to hospitals in Scotland.

Item Type:Book Sections
Additional Information:International Conference on Operations Research (OR2013), Rotterdam, 3-6 Sept. 2013.

The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-07001-8_40

Status:Published
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Manlove, Dr David
Authors: McBride, I., and Manlove, D. F.
College/School:College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
Publisher:Springer International Publishing
ISSN:0721-5924
ISBN:9783319070001
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2014 Springer International Publishing
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher.
Data DOI:10.5525/gla.researchdata.255

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record

Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
607071Efficient Algorithms for Mechanism Design Without Monetary Transfer.David ManloveEngineering & Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)EP/K010042/1COM - COMPUTING SCIENCE