Preference aggregation with incomplete information

Chambers, C. P. and Hayashi, T. (2014) Preference aggregation with incomplete information. Econometrica, 82(2), pp. 589-599. (doi:10.3982/ECTA11612)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11612

Abstract

We show in an environment of incomplete information that monotonicity and the Pareto property applied only when there is common knowledge of Pareto dominance imply (i) there must exist a common prior over the smallest common knowledge event, and (ii) aggregation must be ex ante and ex post utilitarian with respect to that common prior and individual von Neumann–Morgenstern utility indices.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Hayashi, Professor Takashi
Authors: Chambers, C. P., and Hayashi, T.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Econometrica
Publisher:Econometric Society
ISSN:0012-9682
ISSN (Online):1468-0262

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