Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon

Moulin, H. and Vial, J. -P. (1978) Strategically zero-sum games: the class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon. International Journal of Game Theory, 7(3-4), pp. 201-221. (doi:10.1007/BF01769190)

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Abstract

In this paper we propose a new class of games, the “strategically zero-sum games,” which are characterized by a special payoff structure. We show that for a large body of correlation schemes which includes the correlated strategies “à la Aumann”, strategically zero-sum games are exactly these games for which no completely mixed Nash equilibrium can be improved upon.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H., and Vial, J. -P.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Game Theory
ISSN:0020-7276
ISSN (Online):1432-1270

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