Deterrence and cooperation

Moulin, H. (1981) Deterrence and cooperation. European Economic Review, 15(2), pp. 179-193. (doi:10.1016/0014-2921(81)90086-6)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Abstract

In two-person games in normal, bilateral threats succeed in self-enforcing any imputation. We discriminate among imputations by looking at various features of deterring threats. As a result we obtain a classification of two-person games. Finally a duopoly example is analysed.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:European Economic Review
ISSN:0014-2921
ISSN (Online):1873-572X

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record