Moulin, H. (1981) Implementing just and efficient decision-making. Journal of Public Economics, 16(2), pp. 193-213. (doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(81)90024-4)
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Abstract
In an economy with one public good, one private good and quasi-linear utilities we explore decision-making mechanisms to non-cooperatively implement an efficient outcome. By auctioning the leadership role among agents, one implements egalitarianism, namely the efficient outcome that distributes equally the surplus available from an a priori given status quo. A refinement of this mechanism (so-called autioning the leadership with differentiated buds) allows us to implement an efficient anonymous and neutral outcome: it achieves egalitarianism above the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves decision.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
Authors: | Moulin, H. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Journal of Public Economics |
ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
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