Voting with proportional veto power

Moulin, H. (1982) Voting with proportional veto power. Econometrica, 50(1), pp. 145-162. (doi: 10.2307/1912535)

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We give necessary conditions for a neutral social choice function to be partially implementable by means of a strong equilibrium (i.e., implementable by cooperative agents): the veto power of the various coalitions should be maximally distributed. If moreover the social choice function is veto-anonymous, then the veto power of a coalition must be (roughly) proportional to its size: x per cent of the agents have the power to veto x per cent of the candidates. The procedure of "voting by successive veto" is an example of a neutral and (nearly) veto-anonymous social choice function which is implementable.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Econometrica
ISSN (Online):1468-0262

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