Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory

Moulin, H. and Peleg, B. (1982) Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(1), pp. 115-145. (doi: 10.1016/0304-4068(82)90009-X)

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In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions. It is a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability notion generalizes the familiar core of a simple game. We study those effectivity functions yielding a non-empty core for all preference profiles, of which additive effectivity functions are an example. This proves to be closely related to implementation by means of the strong equilibrium concept.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H., and Peleg, B.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Mathematical Economics
ISSN (Online):1873-1538

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