Non-cooperative implementation: a survey of recent results

Moulin, H. (1982) Non-cooperative implementation: a survey of recent results. Mathematical Social Sciences, 3(3), pp. 243-257. (doi:10.1016/0165-4896(82)90073-7)

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Abstract

Strategic decentralization of collective decision-making is considered when the agents' behaviour is non-cooperative. Specifically they use dominant, maximin risk-avert or sophisticated strategies. The existing results applying these equilibrium concepts are reviewed in three familiar economically meaningful contexts: ordinal (as in voting), random (as in bargaining) and quasilinear (as in public goods problems).

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Mathematical Social Sciences
ISSN:0165-4896

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