Generalized condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences

Moulin, H. (1984) Generalized condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences. Social Choice and Welfare, 1(2), pp. 127-147. (doi: 10.1007/BF00452885)

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When preferences are single peaked the choice functions that are independent of irrelevant alternatives both in Nash's and in Arrow's sense are characterized. They take the Condorcet winner of the n individual peaks plus at most n-1 fixed ballots (phantom voters). These choice functions are also coalitionally strategy-proof.<p></p> Next the domain of individual preferences is enlarged to allow for singleplateau preferences: again, Nash's IIA and Arrow's IIA uniquely characterize a class of generalized Condorcet winners choice functions. These are, again, coalitionally strategy-proof.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN (Online):1432-217X

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