From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences

Moulin, H. (1985) From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences, 9(1), pp. 1-17. (doi:10.1016/0165-4896(85)90002-2)

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Abstract

One way to overcome Arrow's impossibility theorem is to drop the requirement that the collective preference be transitive. If it is quasi-transitive (strict preferences are transitive) an oligarchy emerges. If it is only acyclic, many non-oligarchic aggregation rules are available, yet the resulting decision rules are poorly decisive: Nakamura's theorem characterizes acyclic and neutral Arrowian aggregators. We propose a parallel characterization of acyclic and anonymous aggregation methods.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Mathematical Social Sciences
ISSN:0165-4896

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