Choosing from a tournament

Moulin, H. (1986) Choosing from a tournament. Social Choice and Welfare, 3(4), pp. 271-291. (doi: 10.1007/BF00292732)

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Abstract

A tournament is any complete asymmetric relation over a finite set A of outcomes describing pairwise comparisons. A choice correspondence assigns to every tournament on A a subset of winners. Miller's uncovered set is an example for which we propose an axiomatic characterization. The set of Copeland winners (outcomes with maximal scores) is another example; it is a subset of the uncovered set: we note that it can be a dominated subset. A third example is derived from the sophisticated agenda algorithm; we argue that it is a better choice correspondence than the Copeland set.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN:0176-1714
ISSN (Online):1432-217X

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