Moulin, H. (1986) Choosing from a tournament. Social Choice and Welfare, 3(4), pp. 271-291. (doi: 10.1007/BF00292732)
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Abstract
A tournament is any complete asymmetric relation over a finite set A of outcomes describing pairwise comparisons. A choice correspondence assigns to every tournament on A a subset of winners. Miller's uncovered set is an example for which we propose an axiomatic characterization. The set of Copeland winners (outcomes with maximal scores) is another example; it is a subset of the uncovered set: we note that it can be a dominated subset. A third example is derived from the sophisticated agenda algorithm; we argue that it is a better choice correspondence than the Copeland set.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
Authors: | Moulin, H. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Social Choice and Welfare |
ISSN: | 0176-1714 |
ISSN (Online): | 1432-217X |
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