Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism

Moulin, H. (1986) Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism. Journal of Public Economics, 31(1), pp. 53-78. (doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90071-X)

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The pivotal mechanism is strategyproof (demand revealing) in public decision problems where preferences are quasi-linear. Moreover, no agent has an incentive to “free ride” by withdrawing from the committee and consuming whatever decision is taken by the remaining agents. Strategyproofness plus No Free Ride characterize the pivotal mechanism. This mechanism is anonymous and neutral. Yet together Strategyproofness, Anonymity and Neutrality do not characterize it. They will, however, if reasonable lower (or upper) bounds on final utilities are imposed. Our last characterization of the pivotal mechanism uses the No Free Ride axiom and two mild monotonicity properties, but not Strategyproofness.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Public Economics

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