Moulin, H. (1987) The pure compensation problem: egalitarianism versus laissez-fairism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(4), pp. 769-783. (doi: 10.2307/1884280)
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Abstract
A binary choice problem with side-payments and quasi-linear utilities is considered. We study two compensation rules, called social choice functions. The egalitarian rule divides equally the surplus above the average utility level. The laissez-faire rule chooses an efficient decision but performs no transfer. Egalitarianism is characterized by a monotonicity axiom called Agreement: no two agents ever disagree in comparing two distinct preferences of a third one. Laissez-fairism is characterized by the No Subsidy axiom: a coalition would not be worse off if the other agents were not present.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Moulin, Professor Herve |
Authors: | Moulin, H. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Management |
Journal Name: | Quarterly Journal of Economics |
ISSN: | 0033-5533 |
ISSN (Online): | 1531-4650 |
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