Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox

Moulin, H. (1988) Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox. Journal of Economic Theory, 45(1), pp. 53-64. (doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90253-0)

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Abstract

In elections with variable (and potentially large) electorates, Brams and Fishburn's No Show Paradox arises when a voter is better off not voting than casting a sincere ballot.. Scoring methods do not generate the paradox. We show that every Condorcet consistent method (viz., electing the Condorcet winner when there is one) must generate the paradox among four or more candidates.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0022-0531
ISSN (Online):1095-7235

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