Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem

Moulin, H. (1992) Welfare bounds in the cooperative production problem. Games and Economic Behavior, 4(3), pp. 373-401. (doi: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90045-T)

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A general model of lower bound (individual rationality) and upper bound axioms for fair allocation is proposed. The Unanimity welfare function associates to each individual utility function the highest equal utility feasibile when all agents share this utility. If this function is a feasible lower bound (resp. upper bound), then it is the highest lower bound of all (resp. the lower upper bound). Applying this to cooperative production of private goods, we characterize when the Unanimity welfare is a lower (upper) bound function, and when the Stand Alone welfare is an upper or lower bound. Our approach unifies several familiar fairness properties.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:Academic Press

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