Normativity and reason-dependence: a comment on the nature of reasons

Pavlakos, G. (2013) Normativity and reason-dependence: a comment on the nature of reasons. Politica e Società, 2013(3), pp. 449-474. (doi: 10.4476/74761)

Abstract

In his recent From Normativity to Responsibility Joseph Raz argues for three features of practical reasons: that they are facts; that they are facts that can motivate agents qua being reasons; and that they motivate agents in virtue of agents' capacity to reflect on them as reasons (which he labels 'Reason'). The paper identifies a tension between two conceptions of normativity that seem to co-exist in Raz's account: on the first of them, reasons remain psychologically efficacious albeit too subjective; the other, takes reasons to be objective normative facts which exist independently of our practical reasoning (or Reason). I caution against a conflation between mind-dependence (psychologism) and Reasondependence and suggest that practical reasons can remain simultaneously objective and motivating if we understand them in a Reason-dependent fashion. In the course of the paper a number of related questions on the nature of reasons are discussed and clarified.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Pavlakos, Professor George
• Authors: Pavlakos, G.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Law
• Journal Name: Politica e Società
• ISSN: 2240-7901