Improving Nash by coarse correlation

Moulin, H., Ray, I. and Sen Gupta, S. (2014) Improving Nash by coarse correlation. Journal of Economic Theory, 150, pp. 852-865. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008

Abstract

We consider a class of symmetric two-person quadratic games where coarse correlated equilibria – CCE – (Moulin and Vial) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs, while correlated equilibrium – CE – (Aumann) cannot, because these games are potential games with concave potential functions. We compute the largest feasible total utility in any CCE in those games and show that it is achieved by a CCE involving only two pure strategy profiles. Applications include the Cournot duopoly and the game of public good provision, where the improvement over and above the Nash equilibrium payoff can be substantial.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H., Ray, I., and Sen Gupta, S.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0022-0531
ISSN (Online):1095-7235

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