Curiosity and the value of truth

Brady, M.S. (2009) Curiosity and the value of truth. In: Haddock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 265-283. ISBN 9780199231188 (doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0013)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.003.0013

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the question of whether true belief can have final value because it answers our ‘intellectual interest’ or ‘natural curiosity’. The idea is that sometimes we are interested in the truth on some issue not for any ulterior purpose, but simply because we are curious about that issue. It is argued that this approach fails to provide an adequate explanation of the final value of true belief, since there is an unbridgeable gap between our valuing the truth on some issue for its own sake, and that truth's being valuable for its own sake.

Item Type:Book Sections
Status:Published
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M.S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Oxford University Press
ISBN:9780199231188
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