Benefiting from injustice and brute luck

Knight, C. (2013) Benefiting from injustice and brute luck. Social Theory and Practice, 39(4), pp. 581-598. (doi:10.5840/soctheorpract201339433)

Knight, C. (2013) Benefiting from injustice and brute luck. Social Theory and Practice, 39(4), pp. 581-598. (doi:10.5840/soctheorpract201339433)

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Abstract

Many political philosophers maintain that beneficiaries of injustice are under special obligations to assist victims of injustice. However, the examples favored by those who endorse this view equally support an alternative luck egalitarian view, which holds that special obligations should be assigned to those with good brute luck. From this perspective the distinguishing features of the benefiting view are (1) its silence on the question of whether to allocate special obligations to assist the brute luck worse off to those who are well off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice, and (2) its silence on the question of whether to allocate assistance to those who are badly off as a matter of brute luck but not as a result of injustice. In this new light, the benefiting view is harder to justify.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Knight, Dr Carl
Authors: Knight, C.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
Journal Name:Social Theory and Practice
Publisher:Florida State University, Department of Philosophy
ISSN:0037-802X
ISSN (Online):2154-123X
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2013 Florida State University, Department of Philosophy
First Published:First published in Social Theory and Practice 39(4):581-598
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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