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Luck Egalitarianism*

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Abstract. Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that aim to counteract the distributive effects of luck. This article explains luck egalitarianism’s main ideas, and the debates that have accompanied its rise to prominence. There are two main parts to the discussion. The first part sets out three key moves in the influential early statements of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen: the brute luck/option luck distinction, the specification of brute luck in everyday or theoretical terms, and the specification of advantage as resources, welfare, or some combination of these. The second part covers three later developments: the democratic egalitarian critique of luck egalitarianism, the luck egalitarian acceptance of pluralism, and luck egalitarian doubts about the significance of the brute luck/option luck distinction.

‘Luck egalitarianism’ is a term coined by Elizabeth Anderson (1999), an influential critic of the view, to describe a family of egalitarian theories of justice. These theories are distinguished by their focus on counteracting the distributive effects of luck on people’s lives. The view takes its name from the fact that, in its purest form, it makes distributions insensitive to (some forms of) luck, or equalizes the distributive effects of luck. As the

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inverse of luck is often taken to be what individuals are responsible for bringing about (see Hurley 2003, ch. 4; Cohen 2006, 442), luck egalitarianism is sometimes called ‘responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism’. An individual cannot, many hold, be at fault for something which is, for them, a matter of luck. Thus, luck egalitarianism has come to be strongly associated with what Derek Parfit calls ‘the Principle of Equality’, which ‘claims that it is bad if, through no fault of theirs, some people are worse off than others’ (Parfit 1984, 26; see also Temkin 1986, 101; 1993, 13, 17; Arneson 1989, 85; 1990, 177; Cohen 2009, 15, 20 n. 20).

Luck egalitarianism was arguably foreshadowed in the main theory of justice of the twentieth century, John Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’. Rawls (1999, 63, 64) argued that even fair equality of opportunity, which says that ‘those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances’, allows distributions to be settled by ‘the outcome of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective’. His solution to this problem was to combine fair equality of opportunity with the difference principle, which requires that any inequalities further the interests of the worst off. But some have suggested that, as the difficulty Rawls raises turns on the moral arbitrariness of persons’ circumstances, such as natural talent, a more elegant solution would be to minimize the influence of circumstance on distributions while allowing choice to play a role (Kymlicka 2002, ch. 3). This characterization of Rawls as a proto-luck egalitarian is contested (Scheffler 2003; Freeman 2007; Mandle 2009), but Rawls’ concern with the moral arbitrariness of circumstance is undoubtedly an influence on later egalitarians.

The first major contemporary theory with undoubtedly luck egalitarian features was Ronald Dworkin’s (1981b) equality of resources, though his theory also has outcome
egalitarian aspects and he explicitly denied that he was a luck egalitarian (Dworkin 2003). Luck egalitarianism saw its first clear articulations in Richard Arneson’s (1989) equality of opportunity for welfare and G. A. Cohen’s (1989) equal access to advantage. Unsurprisingly given its many distinguished adherents – in addition to Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen, Anderson names Thomas Nagel (1979), Eric Rakowski (1991), John Roemer (1993) and Phillip Van Parijs (1995) – luck egalitarianism has become the most widely discussed post-Rawlsian theory of distributive justice. This survey article aims to elucidate the chief ideas in these key early statements of luck egalitarianism (part I), and describe some important later developments in contemporary egalitarian thought (part II).

I. Early statements

Brute luck and option luck. In spite of its name, luck egalitarianism is not, in its conventional construal, concerned with equalizing the distributive effects of all kinds of luck. The central distinction is between ‘option luck’ and ‘brute luck’, which are defined by Dworkin (1981b, 293) as follows:

Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out – whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined. Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles.
As Dworkin glosses, if shares you have bought rise in value, you have good option luck, and if you are struck by an unexpected meteorite, you have bad brute luck. Option luck is, then, luck that follows from a choice the affected individual has taken, while brute luck is luck that does not follow from the individual’s choice.

On Dworkin’s view, those with bad option luck are due no assistance in the name of equality, provided background conditions of equality of resources were provided. To them we say that ‘the possibility of loss was part of the life they chose – that it was the fair price of the possibility of gain’ (Dworkin 1981b, 294). However, that consideration does not apply to those with bad brute luck. For instance, if one of two otherwise similar individuals is struck with sudden blindness, ‘the accident has (we assume) nothing to do with choices in the pertinent sense. It is not necessary to the life either has chosen that he run the risk of going blind without redistribution of funds from the other’ (Dworkin 1981b, 296). Thus, on Dworkin’s view, the brute luck/option luck distinction marks the divide between luck that calls for redistribution, and luck which requires no such correction. A distinction with similar distributive implications is that between choice and circumstance, though this applies more generally – both to luck and to outcomes that are not mediated by luck (for instance, to the fact that one individual works longer hours than another identical otherwise individual).

On all of this, Dworkin is followed by most luck egalitarianism. For instance, Cohen (1989, 931) writes that ‘[b]rute luck is an enemy of just equality, and, since effects of genuine choice contrast with brute luck, genuine choice excuses otherwise unacceptable inequalities’. While Arneson generally avoids explicit reference to the brute luck and option luck distinction in his early luck egalitarianism, he expresses
substantively equivalent ideas, for example, that ‘[w]hen persons enjoy equal opportunity for welfare in the extended sense, any actual inequality of welfare in the positions they reach is due to factors that lie within each individual's control’ (Arneson 1989, 86). The early luck egalitarians are united in taking the brute luck/option luck and choice/circumstance distinctions as distributively significant, and more specifically as marking the divide between compensable and non-compensable outcomes.

The connection between the brute luck/option luck distinction and egalitarianism has been conceptualized in different ways. Though luck egalitarians sometimes imply that the former can be used to specify and support the latter, this has been disputed (Lake 2001; Hurley 2003, ch. 6). It is crucial here to get clear what we mean by equality. The critics tend to understand egalitarianism as involving a commitment to outcome equality, so the specification objection is that ‘luck does not specify an objection only to inequalities caused by luck’ (Hurley 2006, 459). But luck egalitarians do not, of course, think that outcome equalities are the kind that matters. From their perspective, it is unproblematically the case that luck specifies egalitarianism – it is only those inequalities which are matters of (brute) luck to which egalitarians object (Cohen 2006; Vallentyne 2006).

Ethics and metaphysics. Dworkin distinguishes between two kinds of distributive theories. The first kind are ‘ethically sensitive’ or ‘continuous’. They make their judgments on grounds we recognize in our ‘personal ethics’, understood as ‘our own sense of how we should live and when we are living well and badly’ (Dworkin 2000, 323). The second kind of theory is ‘ethically insensitive’ or ‘discontinuous’. As the name
suggests, these do not use personal ethics to establish what individuals are due as a matter of distributive justice. Such theories ‘do not reflect the distinctions and assignments of responsibility we make in leading our lives from the inside’ (Dworkin 2000, 324).

It is the first, continuous theory that Dworkin favours. Indeed, it is the continuity between his distributive theory and personal ethics that explains the importance of compensating for bad luck. For Dworkin, ‘[t]he distinction between choice and circumstances is not only familiar in first-person ethics but is essential to it’ (Dworkin 2000, 323). Accordingly, he understands brute luck, which defines our circumstances, as settled by ordinary ethics, rather than as the upshot of abstract theorizing. Even if we were philosophically convinced of hard determinism or some other sceptical doctrine about free will, which threatens to categorize every (dis)advantage in our lives as a matter of brute luck, we could not help but continue to lead a life that recognizes the familiar distinction between things that are a matter of choice for us and things that are not. Dworkin’s distributive theory, as one which ‘tracks’ how we experience our lives (Dworkin 2000, 289-290), treats brute luck as the upshot of personal ethics. John Roemer (1993) has suggested the different but related view that egalitarian justice should reflect society’s democratically-expressed views about the extent of individual choice and circumstance.

Arneson and Cohen follow Dworkin in recognizing choice but not circumstance as calling for redistribution, so in that respect they too can be seen as endorsing continuous theories. But while they accept the choice/circumstance distinction, they do not locate it according to everyday ethics as Dworkin does, so their theories can be seen as in that respect discontinuous. When it comes to defining brute luck, Arneson and
Cohen explicitly draw from the moral philosophy and metaphysics of responsibility. More specifically, they aim to make justice sensitive to a distributive form of ‘responsibility as attributability’, which establishes ‘whether some action can be attributed to an agent in the way that is required in order for it to be a basis of moral appraisal’ (Scanlon 1998, 248).

Several philosophers (Fleurbaey 1995; Smilansky 1997; Scheffler 2003; 2005) have suggested that the luck egalitarianism of Arneson and Cohen relies on metaphysical libertarianism (the view that free will is possible and incompatible with causal determinism) for much of its appeal. Luck egalitarianism has even been interpreted as holding ‘that the world consists of voluntary choices that are free from the effects of contingencies’ (Kibe 2011, 11-12). But the view makes no metaphysical or empirical assumptions of this sort, and is compatible with any quantity of free will and responsibility, including zero. Arneson (1989, 86; see also 1990, 178-179; 2004) writes that his luck egalitarianism ‘is distinct from equality of welfare only if some version of soft determinism or indeterminism is correct. If hard determinism is true, the two interpretations of equality come to the same’. Cohen (1989, 934; 1993, 28; 2004, 22) and many other luck egalitarians (e.g. Temkin 1993, 18 n. 33; 2011, 55-57; Knight 2006) similarly hold that whether any outcomes can be attributed to choice for distributive purposes is for the best philosophical accounts of free will and determinism to decide, accounts which are not themselves provided by luck egalitarianism.

Resources and welfare. Another dimension in which Arneson and Cohen differ with Dworkin, but this time also with each other, is on the correct account of advantage.
Advantage can be understood as the good(s) which theories of distributive justice are concerned to distribute. The main candidate goods, at least for luck egalitarians, are resources and welfare.

Dworkin maintains that egalitarianism requires equality of resources. His first approximations of equality of resources involve a desert island example illustrating the ‘envy test’, which holds that ‘no division of resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any immigrant would prefer someone else's bundle of resources to his own bundle’, and an auction in which each immigrant has an equal number of clamshells with which to bid for every item on the island (Dworkin 1981b, 285-287). The envy test, auction and the very name ‘equality of resources’ might suggest a view which aims to equalize material (or as Dworkin has it, ‘impersonal’) resources, such as John Rawls’ ‘social primary goods’ (Rawls 1999, 54-55). However, Dworkin’s view of resources is rather broader, encompassing ‘personal’ resources, which ‘are the qualities of physical and mental health and skill, and other talents and capabilities, which he may also put at the disposal of his life’ (Dworkin 1995, 293). Clearly, personal goods cannot be equalized, so equality of resources instead ‘requires that impersonal resources be adjusted to compensate for differences in personal resources’ (Dworkin 1995, 293). For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that Dworkin takes a special form of insurance to provide the ultimate solution to this problem. He notes that ‘[i]nsurance, so far as it is available, provides a link between brute and option luck, because the decision to buy or reject catastrophe insurance is a calculated gamble’ (Dworkin 1981b, 293). Some kinds of brute bad luck in personal resources, especially serious congenital disabilities and low native talent, cannot be insured against by their victims. Dworkin proposes that the
appropriate level of compensation for a disability is set by the level of protection that would have been bought had all individuals faced identical antecedent risks of developing it (Dworkin 1981b, 297-98, 315-17). The same system is used for talent shortfalls.

Equality of resources is advanced by Dworkin as a superior alternative to equality of welfare. The latter does, he concedes, have ‘an immediate appeal’, as economists adopted welfare ‘to provide a metric for assigning a proper value to resources: resources are valuable so far as they produce welfare’ (Dworkin 1981a, 188). That apparent advantage notwithstanding, Dworkin argues that there are many difficulties with equality of welfare as a doctrine. Foremost among these is ‘the problem of expensive tastes’. If Louis ‘sets out deliberately to cultivate’ tastes that will reduce his welfare below the societal average, unless he is provided with more income to service the new tastes, equality of welfare seems to have the implication that society should provide the increased income, which Dworkin (1981a, 228-29) takes to be implausible.

Arneson has argued that, while such a case defeats equality of welfare, a modified welfarist view, equal opportunity for welfare, is immune to it. Equal opportunity for welfare holds in a weak ‘at a time’ sense where two conditions are satisfied. First, each of a number of persons ‘face[s] an array of options that is equivalent to every other person's in terms of the prospects for preference satisfaction it offers’ (Arneson 1989, 85). Second, these options are ‘effectively equivalent’, meaning either ‘(1) the options are equivalent and the persons are on a par in their ability to "negotiate" these options, or (2) the options are nonequivalent in such a way as to counterbalance exactly any inequalities in people's negotiating abilities, or (3) the options are equivalent and any inequalities in people's negotiating abilities are due to causes for which it is proper to hold the individuals
themselves personally responsible’ (Arneson 1989, 86). Full or ‘extended sense’ equal opportunity for welfare allows that individuals may, consistent with equality, come to have unequal welfare prospects over time. It is satisfied if ‘there is some time at which [persons’] opportunities are equal and if any inequalities in their opportunities at later times are due to their voluntary choice or differentially negligent behavior for which they are rightly deemed personally responsible’ (Arneson 1989, 86). Although Arneson does not put it in these terms, this doctrine clearly has the effect of compensating for differential brute luck (for instance, in initial opportunities) but not compensating for option luck (for instance, in how choices pan out). It is this latter feature which allows equal opportunity for welfare to sidestep Dworkin’s Louis example.

Cohen accepts a large part of Arneson’s analysis, but maintains that, while deficits in welfare prospects require compensation, so too do deficits in resources. Consider Tiny Tim, who requires a wheelchair to be mobile but who, even without the wheelchair, is ‘blessed with abundant opportunity for happiness: he need not do much to get a lot of it’ (Cohen 1989, 918). According to Cohen (1989, 918), this abundance does not remove egalitarians’ concern for Tiny Tim, as ‘[t]hey do not think that wheelchair distribution should be controlled exclusively by the welfare opportunity requirements of those who need them’. Regardless of Tiny Tim’s welfare prospects, egalitarians will be concerned by his resource deficiency, and address it by providing him with a wheelchair. Thus Cohen recognizes both welfare and resources as sources of advantage relevant to egalitarian justice. He proposes equal access to advantage, the ‘access’ part of his proposal intending to capture the notion, also found in Dworkin and Arneson, that egalitarianism need not compensate for all disadvantages, but rather for “'involuntary"
disadvantage, which is the sort that does not reflect the subject's choice’ (Cohen 1989, 920).

II. Later developments

Democratic egalitarian objections to luck egalitarianism. The general shift in egalitarian thought towards responsibility sensitivity and luck equalization was brought to prominence by the most notable critique of this shift. Anderson (1999, 289) argued that luck egalitarianism (or ‘equality of fortune’, to use another of her terms) ‘fails the most fundamental test any egalitarian theory must meet: that its principles express equal respect and concern for all citizens’. This test, which Dworkin (1977, 180-2, 227, 272-3) himself popularized, is said to be failed by luck egalitarianism in three ways.

Firstly, and most importantly, ‘it excludes some citizens from enjoying the social conditions of freedom on the spurious ground that it’s their fault for losing them’ (Anderson 1999, 289). Here Anderson is concerned with ‘the victims of bad option luck’, and more specifically, with those who are made very badly off by option luck. She presents many examples of this, but there are two leading cases. Suppose some individual acts negligently, for instance by driving badly and without insurance, with the result that they are severely injured. Luck egalitarianism attributes such an outcome to noncompensable option luck, and so is guilty of the ‘abandonment of negligent victims’ (Anderson 1999, 295-96; see also Fleurbaey 1995; Scheffler 2003; 2005). The other case concerns the ‘vulnerability of dependent caretakers’ (Anderson 1999, 298). This concerns those ‘who care for dependents – children, the ill and infirm’, and who ‘command no market wage for discharging their obligations to those who cannot take care of
themselves’ (Anderson 1999, 297). Luck egalitarians view such people, who are generally women, as having chosen to use their talents in ways that earn low wages. There is therefore no luck egalitarian basis for relieving them of their poverty, and the resulting dependence on and subordination to (typically male) wage earners.

Secondly, luck egalitarianism ‘makes the basis for citizens’ claims on one another the fact that some are inferior to others in the worth of their lives, talents, and personal qualities’ (Anderson 1999, 289). Here, the focus shifts from those with bad option luck to those with bad brute luck. Luck egalitarianism’s reasons for compensating the disabled, the untalented, and the ugly are their failings relative to others, which makes them appropriate subjects of pity. Pity is, Anderson (1999, 306) holds, ‘incompatible with respecting the dignity of others’.

Finally, luck egalitarianism ‘makes demeaning and intrusive judgments of people’s capacities to exercise responsibility and effectively dictates to them the appropriate uses of their freedom’ (Anderson 1999, 289). This point concerns the means by which luck egalitarianism is applied. To find out how far advantages and disadvantages are matters of option luck, it seems that luck egalitarianism would have to engage in close scrutiny of individual behaviour. It is, Anderson holds, ‘disrespectful for the state to pass judgment on how much people are responsible for their expensive tastes or their imprudent choices’ (Anderson 1999, 310).

The second and third objections come together perhaps most powerfully in cases where those who are already disadvantaged, such as the unemployed, are forced to shamefully reveal, on pain of losing the support of the welfare state, that they tried but could not succeed (Wolf 1998; 2010; Hinton 2001; McTernan 2013). To avoid such
cases, Anderson and other ‘democratic egalitarians’ (Hinton 2001; Scheffler 2003; 2005; Fourie 2012; Sanyal 2012) proposed to replace luck egalitarianism’s apparently exclusive concern with distributive equality with a focus on relational or status equality, recasting egalitarianism as primarily concerned with combating social hierarchies.

A number of responses to the democratic egalitarian critique of luck egalitarianism have been advanced. Some of these necessitate little or no modification of the standard view. For instance, several writers have noted that the ‘vulnerability of dependent caretakers’ aspect of the first objection seems to rely crucially on brute bad luck in background conditions due to a sexist division of labour and socialization (Dworkin 2002, 136-137; Brown 2005, 321-323; Mason 2006, 182-188). Dependent caretakers do not (to use Arneson’s early formula) ‘face an array of options that is equivalent to every other person's in terms of the prospects for preference satisfaction it offers’, given that their caretaking preferences are associated with low incomes, and so they are due compensation after all (Kaufman 2004, 824-25). Likewise, regarding the second objection, Arneson (2000a, 344) notes that the core of luck egalitarianism is concerned with alleviating the plight of those who are badly off through no fault or choice of their own, ‘so the invocation of norms that feed on social status is otiose’. And regarding the third objection, he observes that the social costs of intrusion would be taken into account by welfarist luck egalitarians as welfare losses, which would mandate the avoidance of such policies where the costs outweighed other welfare gains (Arneson 2000b; 2004).

Some writers have similarly claimed that the widely discussed ‘abandonment of negligent victims’ aspect of Anderson’s first objection does not pose practical problems
for standard luck egalitarianism. It can be argued, for example, that inequalities in the real world are very rarely matters of option luck (Barry 2006; Voigt 2007). However, as these theorists note, this does not really address the point of principle, as we can certainly imagine cases in which someone becomes very badly off as a matter of option luck.

*Pluralistic luck egalitarianism.* A common response to this ‘abandonment’ or ‘harshness’ objection is to combine luck egalitarianism with other principles. One such approach is to ground responsibility sensitivity itself in the notion of respect for others’ equal moral status (Stemplowska 2011). More often it is proposed simply to apply luck egalitarianism subject to the constraint that no one be allowed to fall below a certain threshold of advantage, even if they are responsible for disadvantaging themselves (Brown 2005; Barry 2006; Casal 2007). Such a view in essence accepts the ‘sufficientarian’ thesis that the main goal of justice is to secure enough for everyone (Frankfurt 1988; Crisp 2003; Huseby 2010). Where that goal and luck egalitarian goals are at odds, it is the latter that must yield. It is arguable, then, that such an approach compromises the core of luck egalitarianism (Voigt 2007, 405).

Two ingenious variants of the sufficientarian strategy aim to render it compatible with that core. Kok-Chor Tan (2012) has argued that distributive justice, the domain in which luck egalitarianism applies, only covers the area above the sufficiency threshold. Thus, where an individual is severely disadvantaged due to bad option luck, luck egalitarianism has nothing to say, and is not at odds with the humanitarianism that mandates assistance. Shlomi Segall (2010; 2012) proposes that luck egalitarianism properly corrects only brute luck *inequalities*: brute luck equalities are unobjectionable. If
Smith negligently crashes his car, injuring himself, and Jones does not, Segall’s version of luck egalitarianism says that we can treat Smith, restoring him to Jones’ level of advantage, for though the final distribution results from brute luck, it is unobjectionable as outcome equality is always unobjectionable.

Some luck egalitarians have embraced forms of pluralism that go much further than providing a minimal threshold for all. The most developed view of this sort is Arneson’s ‘responsibility-catering prioritarianism’ (Arneson 1999; 2000a; 2000b). Prioritarianism holds that ‘institutions and policies should be set and actions chosen so as to maximize moral value, with the moral value of a gain in wellbeing for a person being greater, the greater its size and the lower the person's prior lifetime expectation of well-being’ (Arneson, 2000b, 95). Arneson’s version is responsibility-catering as it adjusts moral value ‘to reflect the degree of responsibility of each individual for her present condition (whether she is well off or badly off in well-being prospects)’ (Arneson 2000b, 97). It is this feature that makes the view (at least arguably) luck egalitarian. Responsibility-catering prioritarianism can be seen as a revision to luck egalitarianism in two ways, with two corresponding advantages. First, as it makes ‘the moral value of a gain in wellbeing for a person … greater … the lower the person's prior lifetime expectation of well-being’, it offers protection against the infamous levelling down objection to egalitarianism (Parfit 2000, 98). Second, as it makes ‘the moral value of a gain in wellbeing for a person … greater, the greater its size’, it directs the view away from preferring tiny gains for the (brute luck) worst off at the expense of massive costs for everyone else (Arneson 2011, 36). Others have likewise moderated their luck egalitarianism by describing views which also take into account the absolute advantage.
levels of the worst off and/or the overall societal levels of advantage (Cohen 2008, ch. 7; 2011, 69-72; Knight 2009a, ch. 6; Segall 2010, ch. 8; Temkin 2011).

_Luck egalitarian challenges to option luck._ While the original form of luck egalitarianism assigned decisive distributive significance to the brute luck/option luck distinction, that view has been challenged by luck egalitarians in recent years.

Cohen has raised two kinds of doubts about the distinction. First, he argues that disadvantaging tastes, including those arrived at as a matter of option luck, are compensable except where they are not endorsed by the holder’s valuational judgment (Cohen 2004). This is justified on the basis that it is unreasonable to expect persons to act contrary to their judgment (for discussion see Dworkin 2004; Knight 2009b). Consider a simple case in which Alpha and Beta, who are identical, make the same choice, but Alpha ends up with a more favourable outcome than Beta due to differences in their option luck (for example, they take identical gambles that Alpha alone wins). Cohen’s first suggestion is that it would be unfair for Beta to be made worse off than Alpha as a matter of option luck where Beta’s valuational judgment approves of her gambling, as she could only have avoided the gamble through self-alienating violation of her judgment. Second, Cohen (2009) questions whether option luck inequalities are fair, while allowing that they may be legitimate. This may, on his view, lead us to refuse to promote gambles or enforce their results on fairness grounds, but also refuse to enforce reversal of gambles that have taken place (for discussion see Butt 2012). On this view, the inequality that results between Alpha and Beta may be unfair, the kind of thing we should antecedently
discourage, but legitimate, and so not subject to redistribution. These doubts lead Cohen to a much more nuanced position on option luck.

A similarly moderate position, though with substantively different implications, is suggested by the distinction between ‘quasi-gambles’, where the gambler would prefer the expected value of a gamble to facing the gamble itself, and ‘gambles proper’, where the gambler favours the gamble to its expected value (Lippert-Rasmussen 2001). There seems to be more of an intuitive case for denying assistance to losing gamblers proper than there is for denying assistance to losing quasi-gamblers, who might, after all, be risk averse, and exposing themselves to option luck only because it is the prudent thing to do given the lack of attractive low risk alternatives. Accordingly, some writers have proposed that quasi-gamblers are due compensation (Fleurbaey 2001, 520-21; Barry 2008). Suppose that Gamma loves gambling so much that she even takes gambles that she believes to have a low expected outcome, while Beta has no interest in gambling per se, but will take a gamble where the expected outcome of doing so is higher than the expected outcome of lower risk options (for instance, she will accept a 95 per cent chance of £100 and 5% chance of nothing over the certainty of £50). On the view under consideration, Beta, as a quasi-gambler, will be due compensation that Gamma, as a gambler proper, is not.

The final luck egalitarian view to be considered takes a stronger line on option luck. Several writers have mentioned a view according to which option luck inequality is not just sometimes compensable, but fully compensable (Vallentyne 2002, 539-40; Cappelen and Norheim 2005; Lippert-Rasmussen 2005, 259). This ‘all-luck egalitarianism’, as Shlomi Segall (2010, ch. 3), a critic, calls it, disregards the brute
luck/option luck distinction, instead taking the distinction between luck and the direct results of choice as distributively significant. Insofar as individuals are lucky or unlucky, be it due to brute luck or option luck, redistribution is called for. Insofar as the outcome of individuals’ responsible actions are unmediated by luck, distributions are allowed to stand. On this view, for Beta to be compensated, it is sufficient that she has had bad option luck. The compensation will come from Alpha, who has had good option luck. This proposal can be fleshed out by combining it with a substantive account of desert (according to which Alpha and Beta are equally deserving and so have equal entitlements) and/or by saying that individuals are due the expected results of their choices (which are by hypothesis identical for Alpha and Beta) (Arneson 2007; Temkin 2011, 65; Knight 2013). All-luck egalitarianism lies halfway between standard (brute-luck) egalitarianism and outcome egalitarianism: unlike the former it corrects option luck (understood as departures from the deserved or expected results), but unlike the latter it does not redistribute the direct results of choice (understood as actual results matching deserts or expectations). This view offers a more radically egalitarian interpretation of the central luck egalitarian objective of counteracting the distributive effects of luck.

References


