Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost

Cres, H. and Moulin, H. (2003) Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost. International Economic Review, 44(3), pp. 1097-1115. (doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00102)

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Abstract

ndivisible units are produced with increasing marginal costs. Under average cost, each user pays average cost. Under random priority, users are randomly ordered (without bias) and successively offered to buy at the true marginal cost. Both average cost (AC) and random priority (RP) inefficiently overproduce. RP tends to overproduce less, but which game collects more surplus depends much on the demand configuration. We show that a key to compare the welfare properties of the two mechanisms is the crowding factor, i.e., the number of potential users over the number of units of output users can afford: The more crowded the commons, the more RP outperforms AC. In the quadratic cost case, beyond the threshold value of 2.4 for the crowding factor, RP strongly outperforms AC; beneath it AC only mildly outperforms RP. Thus the RP mechanism manages crowded commons better than AC.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Cres, H., and Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Economic Review
ISSN:0020-6598
ISSN (Online):1468-2354

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