A new solution to the random assignment problem

Bogomolnaia, A. and Moulin, H. (2001) A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2), pp. 295-328. (doi: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2710)

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A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. PS is envy-free, RP is not; RP is strategy-proof, PS is not. Ordinal efficiency, Strategyproofness, and equal treatment of equals are incompatible. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D61, D63.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna and Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., and Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Economic Theory
ISSN (Online):1095-7235

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