A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution

Bogomolnaia, A. and Moulin, H. (2002) A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution. Economic Theory, 19(3), pp. 623-636. (doi:10.1007/s001990100168)

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Abstract

All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be preferable to some objects, agents differ on which objects are worse than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial assignment, improves upon (in the Pareto sense) the Random Priority assignment, that randomly orders the agents and offers them successively the most valuable remaining object. We characterize Probabilistic Serial by efficiency in an ordinal sense, and envy-freeness. We characterize it also by ordinal efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna and Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., and Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economic Theory
ISSN:0938-2259
ISSN (Online):1432-0479

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