Random matching under dichotomous preferences

Bogomolnaia, A. and Moulin, H. (2004) Random matching under dichotomous preferences. Econometrica, 72(1), pp. 257-279. (doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.x)

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We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical.

Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants is a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate across all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna and Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., and Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Econometrica
ISSN (Online):1468-0262

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