Stable assignment of public facilities under congestion

Bogomolnaia, A. and Nicolo, A. (2005) Stable assignment of public facilities under congestion. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 7(1), pp. 65-91. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00194.x)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.


We study the problem of locating multiple public facilities when each member of society has to be assigned to exactly one of these facilities. Individuals' preferences are assumed to be single-peaked over the interval of possible locations and negatively affected by congestion. We characterize strategy-proof, efficient, and stable allocation rules when agents have to be partitioned between two groups of users and discuss the normative content of the stability property. Finally we prove that when more than two groups have to be formed, even with common information on the distribution of the peaks, there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and stable allocation rule.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., and Nicolo, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Public Economic Theory
ISSN (Online):1467-9779

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record