Collective choice under dichotomous preferences

Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H. and Stong, R. (2005) Collective choice under dichotomous preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 122(2), pp. 165-184. (doi:10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005)

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Abstract


Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest "approval". It is efficient, strategyproof, anonymous and neutral.

We reach an impossibility if, in addition, each agent's utility is at least , where n is the number of agents; or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no ex ante efficient and strategyproof mechanism guarantees a strictly positive utility to all agents, and prove a weaker statement.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna and Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., and Stong, R.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of Economic Theory
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0022-0531
ISSN (Online):1095-7235

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