The Egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public goods

Wever, S., Savvateev, A., Le Breton, M. and Bogomolnaia, A. (2005) The Egalitarian sharing rule in provision of public goods. Economics Bulletin, 8(11), pp. 1-6.

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Publisher's URL:


In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. We impose two principles, egalitarianism, that requires the equalization of the total cost for all agents in the same jurisdiction, and efficiency, that implies the minimization of the aggregate total cost within jurisdiction. We show that these two principles always yield a core-stable partition but a Nash stable partition may fail to exist. We demonstrate moreover that stable partitions are not necessarily consecutive.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna
Authors: Wever, S., Savvateev, A., Le Breton, M., and Bogomolnaia, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economics Bulletin

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record