Matros, A. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2011) Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(4), pp. 426-431. (doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.08.004)
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Abstract
We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders’ values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator–optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy |
| Authors: | Matros, A., and Zapechelnyuk, A. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
| ISSN: | 0167-7187 |
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