Matros, A. and Zapechelnyuk, A. (2008) Optimal fees in internet auctions. Review of Economic Design, 12(3), pp. 155-163. (doi: 10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9)
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Abstract
An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Zapechelnyuk, Professor Andriy |
Authors: | Matros, A., and Zapechelnyuk, A. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Review of Economic Design |
ISSN: | 1434-4742 |
ISSN (Online): | 1434-4750 |
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