Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core

Bogomolnaia, A. , Le Breton, M., Savvateev, A. and Weber, S. (2007) Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core. International Journal of Game Theory, 35(2), pp. 185-204. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-006-0043-4)

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In this paper, we consider a population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over the unit interval that faces a problem of location and financing of public facilities under the equal share rule. We examine three notions of stability of emerging jurisdiction structures (stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core) and provide a characterization of stable structures.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bogomolnaia, Professor Anna
Authors: Bogomolnaia, A., Le Breton, M., Savvateev, A., and Weber, S.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Game Theory
ISSN (Online):1432-1270

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