Managing withdrawal: Afghanistan as the forgotten example in attempting conflict resolution and state reconstruction

Marshall, A. (2007) Managing withdrawal: Afghanistan as the forgotten example in attempting conflict resolution and state reconstruction. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18(1), pp. 68-89. (doi:10.1080/09592310601173238)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310601173238

Abstract

Perhaps surprisingly, given the availability of new Russian memoir material, some excellent individual monographs, and a large variety of declassified documents, a full operational-political account of the Soviet Union's withdrawal strategy from Afghanistan has yet to be written. This article, utilising openly published yet neglected sources, attempts to fill that gap. The final fate of the Najibullah regime, and the contradictory effect of the National Reconciliation Policy in Afghanistan itself, suggests four key lessons for international forces today as disengagement from both Iraq and Afghanistan again becomes a pressing issue, and as questions around re-creating stability within a failed state scenario again occupy the international community.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Marshall, Dr Alexander
Authors: Marshall, A.
Subjects:D History General and Old World > D History (General) > D839 Post-war History, 1945 on
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > History
Journal Name:Small Wars and Insurgencies
ISSN:0959-2318
ISSN (Online):1743-9558

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record