The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing

Moulin, H. (2008) The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing. Economic Theory, 36(3), pp. 379-405. (doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0275-y)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Abstract

We compute the price of anarchy (PoA) of three familiar demand games, i.e., the smallest ratio of the equilibrium to efficient surplus, over all convex preferences quasi-linear in money. For any convex cost, the PoA is at least 1n in the average and serial games, where n is the number of users. It is zero in the incremental game for piecewise linear cost functions. With quadratic costs, the PoA of the serial game is θ(1logn) , and θ(1n) for the average and incremental games. This generalizes if the marginal cost is convex or concave, and its elasticity is bounded.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economic Theory
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0938-2259
ISSN (Online):1432-0479

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record