Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic viewpoint

Chae, S. and Moulin, H. (2010) Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic viewpoint. International Journal of Game Theory, 39(1), pp. 71-88. (doi: 10.1007/s00182-009-0157-6)

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We introduce a model of bargaining among groups, and characterize a family of solutions using a Consistency axiom and a few other invariance and monotonicity properties. For each solution in the family, there exists some constant α ≥ 0 such that the “bargaining power” of a group is proportional to c α , where c is the cardinality of the group.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Chae, S., and Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Journal of Game Theory
ISSN (Online):1432-1270

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