Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints

Moulin, H. and Laigret, F. (2011) Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints. Games and Economic Behavior, 72(1), pp. 314-320. (doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.002)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Abstract

We propose a simple division of the costs of non-rival resources, when a userʼs need can be met by different subsets of the resources, and no resource is redundant. Our method is characterized by the Stand Alone core property, additivity in costs, and a symmetry requirement.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H., and Laigret, F.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0899-8256

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record