Cost sharing in networks: some open questions

Moulin, H. (2013) Cost sharing in networks: some open questions. International Game Theory Review, 15(2), p. 1340001. (doi: 10.1142/S021919891340001X)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.


The fertile application of cooperative game techniques to cost sharing problems on networks has so far concentrated on the Stand Alone core test of fairness and/or stability, and ignored many combinatorial optimization problems where this core can be empty. I submit there is much room for an axiomatic discussion of fair division in the latter problems, where Stand Alone objections are not implementable. But the computational complexity of optimal solutions is still a very severe obstacle to this approach.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Moulin, Professor Herve
Authors: Moulin, H.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:International Game Theory Review
Publisher:World Scientific Publishing Company
ISSN (Online):1793-6675

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record