Reply to Heck on meaning and truth-conditions

Kemp, G. (2002) Reply to Heck on meaning and truth-conditions. Philosophical Quarterly, 52(207), pp. 233-236. (doi:10.1111/1467-9213.00265)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00265

Abstract

Richard Heck has contested my argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. My reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct my argument.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kemp, Dr Gary
Authors: Kemp, G.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:Blackwell Publishing
ISSN:0031-8094
Published Online:07 January 2003

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