Taub, B. (1986) The tradeoff between social insurance and aggregate fluctuations. Information Economics and Policy, 2(4), pp. 259-276. (doi: 10.1016/0167-6245(86)90003-X)
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Abstract
Government programs that insure individuals against idiosyncratic risks, such as unemployment insurance, attempt to offset shocks that are obscured by behavioral variables. The resultant moral hazard reduces the efficiency of the insurance. When this feature is examined in a dynamic setting, the variance and duration of aggregate income fluctuations may be intensified by insurance.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Taub, Professor Bart |
| Authors: | Taub, B. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Information Economics and Policy |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0167-6245 |
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