Probalistic cheap talk

Chakravorti, B., Conley, J. and Taub, B. (2002) Probalistic cheap talk. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(2), pp. 281-294. (doi:10.1007/s003550100111)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Abstract

We consider a model in which there is uncertainty over when a one-shot game will be played. We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged. We also show that if there is no discounting, this uncertainty imparts a sequential structure that is almost mathematically equivalent to a repeated version of the game with discounting. In particular, a folk theorem applies to such games. Thus, games of probabilistic cheap provide a third interpretation of the repeated game framework with the additional feature that expected payoff is invariant to the probability of the game ending.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Taub, Professor Bart
Authors: Chakravorti, B., Conley, J., and Taub, B.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN:0176-1714
ISSN (Online):1432-217X

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record