The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions

Brady, M.S. (2009) The irrationality of recalcitrant emotions. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), pp. 413-430. (doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9241-1)

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Abstract

A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my own neojudgementalist account. On my view, recalcitrant emotions are irrational insofar as they incline the subject to accept an evaluative construal that the subject has already rejected.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M.S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
ISSN:0031-8116
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:24 June 2008

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
407821Appropriate emotionsMichael BradyArts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)113020/1HU - PHILOSOPHY