Bain, D.T. (2009) McDowell and the presentation of pains. Philosophical Topics, 37(1), pp. 1-24. (doi: 10.5840/philtopics200937113)
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Abstract
It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, rationalizing, and classificatory.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Bain, Dr David |
| Authors: | Bain, D.T. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Philosophical Topics |
| ISSN: | 0276-2080 |
| ISSN (Online): | 2154-154X |
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