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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND COMMUNIST LEGITIMACY

By STEPHEN WHITE*

I. Introduction

IT is generally agreed that all regimes, from naked tyrannies to pluralist democracies, seek to legitimate themselves. In other words, they try to generate a belief in the obedience-worthiness of their rule, which will in normal circumstances secure the acceptance of their decisions without resort to overt coercion.¹ One of the earliest attempts to classify the forms of legitimacy—and still the most influential in the contemporary literature—was that of Max Weber. Regimes, Weber suggested, might seek to legitimate themselves in three main ways: on "rational-legal" or procedural grounds, based upon a belief in the "legality" of a given set of political institutions; on "traditional" grounds, sanctified by long-established usage; or on "charismatic" grounds, based upon a belief in the exceptional qualities of the ruler or of the institutions approved by him.

Although Weber made clear that these "ideal types" did not necessarily exhaust the repertoire of means of political legitimation, his classification has remained central to most modern discussions of legitimacy. Its influence is apparent in more recent accounts: the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, for instance, distinguishes between "numinous" and "civil" legitimacy (broadly speaking, Weber’s second and third forms of legitimacy and his first form, respectively). At least one modern author has argued that Weber’s threefold typology “has the same status in social science that an older Trinity has in Christian theology.”²

* An earlier version of this paper was presented to seminar audiences at the Universities of Essex and Edinburgh and at St. Antony’s College, Oxford; I have benefited from the discussions that followed.


Of Weber's three modes of legitimation, it is perhaps the rational-legal or procedural that has the most obvious relevance to contemporary nation-states in the Western world, where legality generally inheres in the process of competitive election by which governments are formed. Legitimacy of this nature has normally been sufficient to secure acceptance of the decisions of governments established in this manner in the liberal democracies, even when (as has often been the case in the 1970s and 1980s) the interests of many citizens have been adversely affected. In states whose regimes are not legitimated in this way, as in the communist countries, the claim to rule is generally based upon other grounds: to some extent upon traditional and charismatic grounds, but particularly upon a source of legitimacy to which Weber gave no direct attention: socioeconomic performance, or what has been called "social eudaemonic" legitimation (from the Greek word for happiness). This mode of legitimation is based upon the role of government in providing social and economic benefits for its citizens—a role generally assumed by governments to a significant degree only some time after Weber's death. For communist and other authoritarian systems, socioeconomic or "performance" grounds of this kind have typically been seen as the single most important basis upon which they may seek legitimation.

It has been suggested that this distinctive legitimation formula, and the political-economic tradeoff upon which it is based, may be described as a "social contract," "social compact," or "social compromise." The regimes concerned provide few of the civil liberties that citizens of the liberal democracies take for granted: free speech, an independent press, a rule of law, and genuine rather than plebiscitary elections. On the other hand, communist regimes do generally provide a high level of social welfare: a comprehensive educational and health care system, security of employment and stable prices, modest but steadily rising living standards and upward career mobility—all of them sustained by

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1 Arnold Gehlen, Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1963), 255.


high and steady rates of economic growth within a framework of public ownership and central planning. This has not always been an entirely successful legitimation formula: uprisings in the G.D.R., Poland, and Hungary during the 1950s, for instance, showed the limitations of the social compact as a basis for regime authority, particularly in countries in which communist rule was an alien imposition and in which socialist institutions have never enjoyed the support of popular consensus. What has mattered more in the 1970s and 1980s, however, is that communist governments have found it increasingly difficult to deliver their side of the politico-economic contract; in particular, they have suffered from generally declining rates of economic growth, making it more and more difficult for them to provide the socioeconomic benefits on which the social compact was premised. In the absence of alternative (particularly rational-legal) grounds for legitimation, it has widely been agreed that the stability or obedience-worthiness of many communist regimes must be seriously and perhaps critically affected.

One of the first to point to such difficulties, even before the growth rate in communist countries had begun to falter, was Richard Löwenthal. Basing himself mainly upon the experience of the Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia, Löwenthal pointed out that, although communist regimes had generally performed satisfactorily in social and economic terms, no regime—communist or otherwise—could guarantee a continuously successful performance in these or any other respects. Communist regimes, in other words, could only temporarily and precariously be legitimated by their socioeconomic performance; in the long run, there was “no alternative to legitimacy based upon institutional procedures.”

Seweryn Bialer, writing more recently on the “politics of economic stringency” in the U.S.S.R., has noted that the Soviet leadership will face difficult choices in the remainder of the 1980s in view of demographic, national, military, and other pressures, and the absence of an agreed procedure for setting priorities among them. A relatively high growth rate of perhaps 3 percent per annum, he suggests, might enable the Soviet leaders to “muddle through” until at least the end of the decade; a lower growth rate of perhaps 1 or 1½ percent might precipitate a “socio-political crisis of major proportions.”


A similarly apocalyptic view is taken in a wide variety of other works—for instance, in Marshall Goldman’s *Crisis in the Soviet Union: The Failure of an Economic System* (1983), Stephan Hedlund’s *Crisis in Soviet Agriculture* (1984), and Jan Drewnowski’s edited symposium, *Crisis in the East European Economy* (1982). R. V. Burks has also pointed to declining rates of economic growth, an alcoholism problem of “epidemic proportions,” and problems of energy and labor supply; he argues that “all the ingredients for some kind of explosion are increasingly in place.”\(^8\) Richard Pipes maintains that all the communist systems are in the “throes of a serious economic crisis”; the Soviet system, in particular, is suffering not only from an economic slowdown, but from an indecisive and unpopular leadership and the strains of its multinational empire. Pipes concludes that the Soviet Union today fits Lenin’s definition of a “revolutionary situation.”\(^9\)

To some extent, these views may reflect a tendency toward wishful thinking on the part of scholars with a particularly strong personal antipathy toward the communist states and the ideology with which they are associated. The views that have been quoted, however, represent a fairly wide spectrum of academic opinion, and the issues that have been raised are real, not imaginary ones. Serious economic difficulties—which have been acknowledged by the regimes themselves—are bound to have some kind of effect, if not perhaps a cataclysmic one, upon the stability or legitimacy of communist rule as such. In the remainder of this paper, I propose to consider, first, some of the broad parameters of the economic deterioration in the communist countries to which all commentators have drawn attention and which underlies what is taken to be the “crisis” in their legitimacy. I will then examine some of the deterministic conclusions for the stability of communist systems that have been drawn from the deterioration in economic performance. Finally, in the main part of the paper, I will outline four “mechanisms of adaptation” by which the effects of the deterioration in economic performance upon the political systems of those countries may be mediated.

**II. Economic Performance and the “Social Compact” in Communist Systems**

The political consequences of the economic performance of the communist countries, not their economic performance as such, constitute

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\(^8\) Burks, “The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union,” *East European Quarterly* 18 (Spring 1984), 61-71.

\(^9\) Pipes, “Can the Soviet Union Reform?” *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Fall 1984), 47-61, at 50.
the main concern of this paper. It is necessary, at the outset, nonetheless, to indicate some of the main features of the recent economic performance of the communist countries. The period since the late 1950s or early 1960s, it would be widely agreed, has seen, if not a crisis, at least a significant and still continuing economic slowdown in the communist countries. There has obviously been considerable variation from year to year, and from country to country. The broad trends, however, are remarkably similar (see Table 1). In the Soviet Union—the largest communist economy and one whose performance has a major impact upon all others in the communist world—annual rates of economic growth (by the Soviets’ definition) averaged 11.4 percent in the early 1950s, 9.1 percent in the later 1950s, 6.5 percent in the early 1960s, 7.7 percent in the later 1960s, 5.7 percent in the early 1970s, 4.4 percent in the later 1970s, and a planned 3.4-3.7 percent in the first half of the 1980s. These last figures, the lowest planned increases in Soviet history, are nonetheless unlikely to be achieved; 1981 and 1982 were particularly poor years, with 1982 registering a 2 percent growth rate—the lowest in Soviet

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Unweighted average 13.1 8.6 6.1 8.1 7.7 4.6 1.9


history. Although 1983 was somewhat better (3.1 percent), 1984 resumed the earlier trend with a recorded increase in net material product of just 2.6 percent.11

The picture is more varied in Eastern Europe. Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic have been performing relatively successfully, while Poland has performed particularly badly; but the broad trend is similar in all these countries. According to C.I.A data, for instance, average growth rates of 4.7 percent were attained in Eastern Europe in the early 1970s, but the annual figures for 1976-1981 were 3.2, 2.8, 1.0, -0.6 and -0.9 percent. The figures were still worse when considered on a per capita basis.12 Of the other communist countries, China has performed variably, with just 1.5 percent growth in 1981, but much better in 1983 and 1984.13 Yugoslavia, however, has done perhaps worst of all, with just 1 or 2 percent growth in the early 1980s, an officially recorded inflation rate of 60 percent, 10 percent nonagricultural unemployment, a massive foreign debt, and an average fall in living standards of 40 percent over the past five years.14 It is perhaps not surprising that a Yugoslav student newspaper went so far as to publish an “obituary” for the Yugoslav economy, which, it asserted, had expired altogether in 1984.15

There is much room for discussion about the definitions of economic growth that are employed, the variations between rates of growth that are reported in different sources, the time span over which performance is calculated, and even the desirability, in itself, of economic growth. It is also possible to argue that the relevant basis of comparison may not be the earlier performance of these countries, but that of the industrialized West, which has been experiencing a serious and prolonged economic recession over the same period, accompanied by high and still rising levels of unemployment of a kind that the communist states have on the whole avoided. It is nonetheless difficult to dispute that the communist countries, taken as a whole, have experienced a major slowdown in their rates of economic growth; that this slowdown is a trend which is still continuing, although it may have stabilized temporarily in 1983 and 1984; and that it has exposed serious and deep-seated problems in the areas of technological innovation, utilization of scarce

resources (particularly energy), price levels, overcentralization, and the whole complex of issues that economists have associated with the transition from extensive to intensive growth. The communist regimes have found it difficult to cope with these problems, which may indeed not be readily resolvable within the parameters of "actually existing socialism." It is also clear that there is every reason, at least on the face of it, to expect this economic slowdown to have serious consequences for the social compact or for the the politico-economic equation upon which, it has been argued, the regimes' legitimacy is based.

The social compact involves the surrender of a wide range of political liberties, such as competitive elections and an independent press, in return for a range of socioeconomic benefits, such as comprehensive social security, full employment, stable prices, easygoing industrial discipline and steadily rising living standards. All of this is threatened, at least in principle, by the economic slowdown, which has led to a series of sharp price rises particularly for energy-related commodities, but also (in some cases) for foodstuffs, household goods, and public services. (In Poland—admittedly an exceptional case—food prices rose no less than 162 percent of 1982; very substantial rises have also occurred in Bulgaria and Hungary.) There have also been serious shortages in many communist countries, accompanied by the introduction or extension of rationing and (inevitably) of profiteering. Attempts have been madc to encourage firms to stiffen industrial discipline and shed labor, though not to reintroduce unemployment as such; career and social mobility have obviously suffered as well."

Concurrent with the failure to catch up with or, in some cases, to keep pace with the Western economies, growing signs of a moral crisis or loss of faith in both public and private life have become evident. There has been an increasingly apparent alienation from the party and the official ideology; a turn toward more private preoccupations, such as religion, pop music, or the "second economy"; and a greater reported incidence of drug-taking, sexually transmitted diseases, juvenile delinquency, and alcoholism. Social problems such as poverty and the situation of the elderly have emerged or become more serious; there has been a reported fall in life expectancy and a rise in infant mortality in some of these countries. In a few cases, despite the sanctions that the authorities

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have at their disposal, an overt political opposition has developed—most
conspicuously Solidarity in Poland, but also Charter 77 in Czechoslo-
vakia, the church-based peace movement in the G.D.R., and nationalist
movements in Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo. The conclusion might
appear to follow that the communist regimes, lacking formal or rational-
legal legitimacy, have been placed in a serious—indeed perhaps critical—
position by their increasing inability to provide the accustomed range
of social and economic benefits to their citizens—or, in other words, to
sustain their side of the social compact on which their legitimacy is
founded.

III. THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY IN COMMUNIST
SYSTEMS

It is possible to take issue with this thesis in several ways. For instance,
on the economic side of the equation, there have undoubtedly been
difficulties in the communist countries in recent years. The regimes,
nonetheless, have managed for the most part to sustain a growth rate
of 3 to 4 percent in the early 1980s; this figure is respectable at least by
Western standards, and is apparently sustainable for some time to come.10
They have done so, moreover, while generally retaining full employment
(except for Yugoslavia) and maintaining stable prices at least for basic
commodities such as foodstuffs (although here there are more excep-
tions). Within the somewhat lower levels of economic growth they have
been able to maintain, the communist leaders have had some freedom
of maneuver in terms of the distribution of material rewards; in par-
cular, they have been able to ensure that the social group that has
benefited more than any other from economic growth is the industrial
working class, upon whose continued support or acquiescence the re-
gimes depend above all for their stability.11

With greater mobility and increased exchange of information, the
citizens of communist countries can more readily compare their situation
with that of their counterparts in the capitalist West; comparisons of
this kind, however, are by no means entirely to the disadvantage of the
communist regimes. Higher levels of violence and crime, massive and
still rising unemployment, and the absence of a guaranteed (albeit mod-
est) standard of living do not appeal greatly to populations whose his-
torical experience has inclined them to conceive of rights for the most

10 World Economic Survey 1984 (fn. 13), 1, 87-88.
11 See, for instance, Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, eds., Blue-collar Workers in Eastern
part in collective and economic rather than in individual and political terms. Official toleration of forms of unorthodox economic activity, such as "colored markets" or the "second economy," may also help to absorb popular energies and to reduce dissatisfaction in areas such as tailoring, restaurants, and domestic repairs, in which central planning has always tended to perform inefficiently.

It nonetheless remains true that the slowdown in economic growth which the communist countries have experienced provides their leaders with perhaps the most serious challenge they have faced since industrialization; and the political management of that economic slowdown is an issue with serious implications for the stability or legitimacy of communist rule. I will argue, however, that the manner in which the political consequences of the economic slowdown in the communist countries has been posed—for instance by the writers quoted at the outset—requires some reconsideration. The relationship has generally been seen as one in which the economic factor is dominant and the political factor is the subordinate or dependent variable. I consider this to be an unduly determinist manner of conceiving that relationship; it sees the regimes as largely helpless in the face of a deterioration in their economic performance, and their legitimacy as almost exclusively a function of that performance. I intend to reassert the primacy of politics and to point to the ability of the regimes themselves to maneuver, to adjust, to coopt, and in one way or another to preempt the seemingly inevitable.

More particularly, I wish to suggest that an emphasis upon crisis in the communist systems is premature; and that the economic difficulties they face may be mediated by political action. Moreover, although they certainly lack procedural legitimacy of the kind conferred by competitive elections, other forms of linkage or "mechanisms of adaptation" are available by which the governmental authorities in these countries can absorb and process demands, expand the consultative capacities of their systems, give a stake in the system to various sections of their populations, and perhaps preempt demands for more far-reaching and antisystemic change.

There is usually no obvious party or ideological interest in issues such as housing, transportation, youth, and women's questions with which the mass public in communist countries is apparently mainly concerned, and the regimes have generally little to lose and a great deal to gain by at least appearing to take popular preferences into account on such

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22 This term is taken from W.J.M. Mackenzie's work on political adaptivity; see his Biological Ideas in Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), esp. chap. 6.
matters. As the economic bases of legitimacy seem to decline in importance, it may prove possible to shift some of the burden of legitimation from purely economic performance to these other political or procedural bases. At least four such mechanisms are of particular importance in this connection.

IV. MECHANISMS OF ADAPTATION IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS

The first mechanism of adaptation is electoral linkage: that is, the increasing use by communist regimes of the electoral mechanism (and indeed of representative institutions themselves) to provide, if not a genuine choice, then at least a degree of apparent choice from among a range of officially sponsored candidates. Twenty years ago, anything other than a single-slate election was an isolated phenomenon in the communist countries. In the mid-1980s, some degree of choice is characteristic of more than half of the world’s communist systems, and is still gaining ground.23 Poland, in 1956, was one of the first to establish the practice of nominating more candidates than there were seats available, albeit by a “list” system with a heavy bias in favor of the approved candidates—who were placed at the top of the ballot.24 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, this system afforded at least a modest degree of citizen involvement in the political process; the civil unrest of the early 1980s led, not to its suspension, but to its cautious extension in electoral arrangements for local and national elections in 1984 and 1985—which provided, for the first time, for the nomination of two candidates for each of the seats available. In the 1985 general election, for instance, two candidates were selected for each of the 410 popularly-elected seats, with a further 50 candidates selected for a separate and uncontested national list. The outcome was not entirely successful from the regime’s point of view: in the 1984 local elections, candidates outnumbered voters at many pre-poll meetings, and in the October 1985 general election the level of turnout was no more than 78.9 percent (or 66 percent according to Solidarity)—much lower than the 1980 turnout of 98.8 percent or the normal figures for communist general elections. The exercise was nonetheless sufficiently satisfactory for the authorities to retain these procedures for future local and national elections.25

Some discussion of the extension of electoral choice took place in the

25 Trybuna Ludu, June 20, 1984, p. 1; “Elections to the People’s Councils,” Poland Watch,
U.S.S.R. in the 1960s, but it had no impact upon established procedures and has not been continued.\textsuperscript{26} In Bulgaria, the possibility of electoral choice was formally provided for in 1973, but has not as yet been brought into effect.\textsuperscript{27} In Czechoslovakia, the electoral law of 1967, which provided for a degree of electoral choice, was rescinded in 1971 without having been implemented.\textsuperscript{28} A list system is employed in the G.D.R., which secures the election, in all but exceptional circumstances, of the regime's approved candidates.\textsuperscript{29} So far as is known, no reforms of this nature have at any time been suggested in Albania, which is one of the communist countries that claims no less than 100 percent electoral turnout and support for its single slate of candidates.\textsuperscript{30} The general trend in most communist countries, however, is firmly in the direction of multiple candidacies.

In Romania, for instance, the 1975 elections were the first to take place with more candidates than seats available: 139 of the 349 constituencies offered two candidates for the single seat available in each, and there were several cases of two Central Committee members running against each other. In the 1980 and 1985 elections, these principles were taken further, with 151 and 145, respectively, of the 369 constituencies offering a choice of two candidates and a further 39 and 40, respectively, offering a choice of three.\textsuperscript{31} In China, the new electoral law of 1979, which came into effect in 1980, made provision for the nomination of up to twice as many candidates as seats available at both the local and national level. A secret ballot has also been held for a regional party secretary, although the result required ratification by the Central Committee.\textsuperscript{32}

Most remarkably of all, in Hungary the practice of multiple candidacies, first introduced in 1967, was made mandatory in 1983 for all

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\textsuperscript{27} See Ribary and Feher (fn. 1), 41.
\textsuperscript{30} In the 1982 elections in that country, only one voter is reported to have failed to endorse the single slate of candidates; see \textit{Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1983} (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 237.
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elections at the local and national levels from 1985 on. "For years there has been voting in Hungary," Imre Pozsgay, Secretary General of the People’s Patriotic Front, told Radio Budapest; "now there will be an election." In the national elections that took place on June 8, 1985, 42 of the 352 contestable seats failed to return a single candidate with more than 50 percent of the votes (by-elections will be held in these constituencies), and 25 of the 71 independently nominated candidates were elected in place of candidates sponsored by the PPF. Of those who lost their seats, 54 were incumbents and 26 were present or former members of the party and/or state administration. The same principles have been followed within the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, where the first competitive elections for a country-level party secretary took place in 1983, in the Academy of Sciences, in the trade unions, and on cooperative farms, where more than one-fifth of officially sponsored candidates have recently been voted down.

No communist country has yet introduced a system of genuinely competitive elections, nor, perhaps, could such a system be established without resulting in the end of the leading role of the Communist Party and other distinguishing features of communist rule. Nonetheless, taken in conjunction with more active legislatures (particularly their committee systems) and with more active and authoritative local councils—both also general trends in communist countries—the electoral mechanism appears to represent at least some means by which communist systems may seek to expand their political base, to strengthen their links with the population, and to increase the willingness of the latter to accept unpopular decisions because of their apparently greater influence upon the composition of those who make them. The regimes themselves, at least, appear to take this view: as the General Secretary of the Hungarian PPF put it in an interview, there was a need for "more democracy to help cope with the economic crisis." In Hungary, as in most other communist countries, economic adversity has indeed been met by the cautious extension of the electoral principle in all areas of public life, not simply in elections to legislative bodies. It would be too much to suggest that electoral linkages in themselves offer a means by which

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35 See Nelson and White (fn. 28), and Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Local Politics in Communist Countries (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1980).
communist regimes can avoid all the political consequences of their deteriorating economic performance. Nonetheless, in conjunction with other mechanisms, they may make at least a modest contribution to the acceptability or legitimacy of communist rule under economic circumstances that appear likely to become increasingly adverse.

A second mechanism of adaptation is political incorporation, particularly through membership of the ruling Communist Party. This may mean no more than an increase in the proportion of the population enrolled within the party’s ranks, from about 3 to 4 percent in the 1950s to about 6 to 10 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, and a still higher proportion of those within the relevant age groups. In some cases, the rate of enrollment has been much more substantial (see Table 2); in the G.D.R. and in Romania, for instance, party membership has been extended to over 20 percent of all adults and to almost one-third of the economically active population—a very inclusive conception of membership for a political party that is supposed to be of the Leninist or “vanguard” type. More important is the increase that has occurred in the working-class enrollment of the ruling parties, which has also been a feature of the politics of most communist countries since about the 1960s. In the U.S.S.R., for instance, workers (by social origin) accounted for just 32 percent of the party’s members in 1957, but for 44.4 percent by 1984—the largest single social group among the total membership. Among candidate members, where the leadership’s recruitment policies are more readily apparent, workers have accounted for almost 60 percent of the total in recent years. These are among the highest levels in the party’s history. The proportion of workers (by current occupation rather than social origin) has increased similarly in most of the East European parties (see Table 2). The Albanian, Bulgarian, Czech, East German, and Hungarian parties have all recorded substantial net increases. The Polish party presents a more uneven picture with a fluctuating working-class membership since the early 1960s, reaching a reported 46.2 percent in 1979, but falling to about 40 percent in 1984. The Yugoslav party has also not generated a substantial increase, fluctuating at a level of about 30 percent since the 1960s. The Romanian party, however, presents the most dramatic picture of all: the proportion

37 See Scharf (fn. 29), 42; Scimate, March 27, 1984, p. 3.
39 Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Poland, June 11, 1984. However, “nearly 50 percent” of current recruits are reported to be workers. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Eastern Europe 762/C3, June 6, 1984.
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of workers by current occupation has increased from 39.6 percent in 1965 to 56.5 percent in 1984; among new recruits, workers accounted for a staggering 80 percent of the total enrollment in the early 1980s.46

The picture, accordingly, is a varied one; moreover, the figures are ambiguous and reflect different definitions of what a “worker” might be, strong pressures to report totals that accord with current leadership priorities, and so forth. It is also difficult to argue that the industrial working class has been successfully “incorporated” in, for instance, Poland, where a rapid increase in the party’s working-class membership in the 1970s coincided with an increasing degree of centralization of power within the party, and of party power within the political system generally. These circumstances, combined with substantial and widely resented privileges and inequalities at top levels in the party and elsewhere, encouraged workers to leave the PZPR almost as quickly as they had joined it earlier; the whole exercise may have tended to increase disillusionment and alienation within the political system rather than to reduce them.47

It would also be wrong to conceptualize greater working-class membership in the ruling parties as in some sense equivalent to a greater degree of working-class political authority within these organizations. The ruling parties remain democratic centralist in their operation, with little opportunity, in ordinary circumstances, for rank-and-file members to exert a significant degree of influence upon the decisions of executive committees or upon the composition of their membership. Nonetheless, taken in conjunction with, for instance, greater working-class representation on committees and in bureaus at all levels of the party,48 and perhaps even exercises such as meetings of the party leadership in regional centers and “surprise” visits to the homes of ordinary workers (as has happened in Poland and to some extent in the U.S.S.R.),49 membership in the ruling party does appear to represent a mechanism of adaptation of some significance; although always effective, it does at least provide some room for maneuver for the party leadership in di-

48 In the Soviet case, for instance, the proportion of industrial workers on regional, territorial, and republican committees has increased from 27.8% in 1965-66 to 31.1% in 1980-81, with correspondingly higher numbers being recorded at lower levels of the party organization. See Voprosy istorii, No. 2 (1984), 4.
recting recruitment policy and in making use of enrollment to engage the members of particular social groups within the party's framework and to incorporate them within the political process.

A third and related mechanism of adaptation may be called *associational incorporation*—in other words, the role played by bodies such as the trade unions, people’s control committees, and police auxiliaries in linking the population with the regime, channelling political energies within established institutions, and absorbing demands that might otherwise assume an antisystemic form. Since the 1960s, there has been much greater official emphasis upon the role of such associational groups, and serious attempts have been made to strengthen their leadership and to expand their formal powers at local and national levels. There are, of course, echoes of events in Poland in much of this, as in the more recent increases in working-class membership of the ruling parties. For instance, when the Soviet leadership replaced the head of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, Aleksei Shibayev, in early 1982, the intention was in part to preempt the possibility of Polish-style developments. The new head is Stepan Shalaev, who until that point had been minister of the timber industry, and had been—most unusual in Soviet politics—a long-serving trade union official earlier in his career.44

Similarly, a new law on labor collectives, adopted in June 1983, provides for twice-yearly meetings of the work force in each enterprise and for more extensive powers for them to decide on, rather than simply to propose, changes concerning matters that fall within their competence.45 Other bodies, such as the People’s Control Committees, have been given new and expanded responsibilities. A law of 1979 represents (in the view of the leading Western student of these matters) a “sizable step forward for the People’s Control Agency and its inspectors,” and can be seen as part of a broader expansion of the role of citizen participation and of representative institutions in the post-Stalin period.46

In the somewhat unusual circumstances that currently exist in Poland, Solidarity has been dissolved, but there has been no reversion to the discredited pre-1980 system; new unions have been established which, while subject to overall party guidance and still regarded with some skepticism, by 1985 enrolled 5 million members (including 600,000 pensioners) out of the 17 million work force. The new unions have sought to demonstrate that they are not dominated by the party authorities;

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44 *Pravda*, March 6, 1982, p. 2.
they claim to have enrolled many former Solidarity activists within their ranks, and they firmly opposed the government-sponsored price rises introduced in early 1985.47 There have been no comparable developments in Czechoslovakia, where ritual calls were made for the reactivation of the unions at the 1982 trade union congress, and in Romania, where trade unions have lost some formal powers and political representation.48

In most of the communist countries, however, trade unions and other associational bodies have been gaining rather than losing authority since at least the 1960s. This has clearly been the case in Hungary, for instance, where, under Sandor Gaspar (head of the Hungarian trade unions from 1965 until December 1983), unions have had a real, not just a formal, right of veto over management decisions that violate the collective contract. Unions also have substantial powers in relation to safety regulations, working conditions, and wages, as well as managerial appointments and dismissals. More generally, the unions’ criticisms in Hungary have shifted from isolated incidents involving individual workers to direct criticism of government and party policy. What has been described as the “high point [of] trade union authority in communist states” occurred when the Hungarian National Trade Union Council was asked to comment on the party’s guidelines for a forthcoming congress: the Trade Union Council openly attacked the guidelines on a number of points, including their failure to place the trade unions on the same level as the Communist Party and the state as an instrument of workers’ power, and for underestimating the role of trade unions generally.49 Even in Bulgaria, which is generally little influenced by reformist currents in the other communist states, major reforms in late 1984 have increased the role of labor collectives in social and economic life; the trade unions have been given a stronger leadership, and are at the same time being urged to improve their internal democracy and effectiveness.50

None of this should be taken to suggest that trade unions and other associations in communist systems have attained powers and authority comparable in degree or kind with those of their counterparts in the liberal democracies. The only sustained attempt to establish a genuinely independent and self-governing trade union in a communist country

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that has so far been made—in Poland—was brought to an abrupt end in 1981. Strikes are virtually prohibited in these countries, with the significant exception of Yugoslavia, where several thousand have taken place since 1958. (The longest ever, lasting over 60 days, occurred in 1984.) Nevertheless, the Hungarian experience in particular suggests that more active, influential trade unions and other associational bodies may represent a mechanism of adaptation of some importance. By acting as “lightning conductors,” they provide a means through which complaints and problems can be dealt with at a subsystemic level and isolated from possible challenge to the regime, whose interests are not necessarily at stake in disputes over working conditions, overtime, grading, or the maintenance of public order. More generally, such institutions may serve as a further means by which the working class can be incorporated into the regime, bound to some extent to its purpose, and encouraged to promote its interests within the established framework rather than outside and possibly in opposition to it.

A fourth and final mechanism of adaptation is letters to the party, the state, and above all to the press. In the Soviet case this has been a development of the period since the 1960s; it found institutional expression with the establishment of a Letters Department in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus in 1978. In the early 1980s, the Central Committee received about half a million letters a year, and about 20,000 callers at its Moscow offices; it also prepared a flow of dossiers (about 60 in 1983) based upon these communications to the party leadership and other bodies. The major Soviet daily newspapers receive about the same number of letters annually—a total of about 60 to 70 million for the national press as a whole (which represents one letter per year from every two or three adults). Citizens may also visit newspaper offices in the major cities. A few of the letters are published; many more are investigated directly by the papers’ staff; and all are classified, with regular breakdowns being sent to party, state, trade unions, and other bodies. Sociological surveys suggest that, while there is some skepticism as to the effectiveness of communications of this kind, many people agree that the newspaper has helped them with a personal or social problem; Soviet citizens generally placed newspapers first among the means available to them to influence the actions of the authorities.

Mechanisms of this kind have also been employed in other communist

52 Przeda, February 3, 1984, p. 2.
countries, for instance in China. Particularly since 1978, more letters have been published in People's Daily and other newspapers than ever before, more letters have been received, the letters are more direct and critical in character, and they are more interrelated. The letters column in People's Daily is reported to have "come close to becoming a forum for public discussion." In Romania, the Jiu valley miners' strike of 1977, in which 35,000 people were reportedly involved, led directly to a greater degree of attention to the role of citizens' complaints, suggestions, and observations. Directives issued in 1978 and extended in 1982 explained to Romanian party and state bodies how to deal with such communications; the number of letters is reported to have increased from about 1 million in 1965 to about 1.7 million in 1984, or about one for every eight or nine adult citizens.

Again, there is no suggestion that in any communist country the press plays a genuinely independent role comparable with that in liberal democracies. Newspapers in the communist countries operate within a context of censorship, their editorial staffs are normally appointed with the approval of party officials, and they receive detailed guidance on the manner of their operation at regular briefing sessions in party offices. Letters to the papers may be ignored, they may be malicious or self-serving, or (as has happened in many cases) the complainant may be victimized by his immediate superiors even though the original criticism may have been justified. Nonetheless, communist leaders clearly see newspapers as playing an important role in conveying at least the impression that popular concerns are being brought into the open. A substantial flow of letters from ordinary citizens helps guard against the abuse of position, illegality, and incompetence of party and state officials at lower levels; it also alerts the leadership to major issues of public concern, allowing them to be dealt with before they assume a more substantial, unapproved, and perhaps even violent form. Most of the complaints that are received seem to concern isolated cases of maladministration: a family may not have received its proper housing entitlement, or the local public transport system may have broken down, or a supply of drinking water may have been cut off for an unduly long time. On more general issues, such as the food supply or the maintenance of law and order, the Soviet

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leadership appears to have received a very substantial volume of mail, much of it anonymous and expressed in very direct terms. Letters of this kind are not normally selected for publication in a newspaper or party journal, but only a foolish party leadership would entirely ignore such massive expressions of public opinion. The "food program" of 1982 and stronger measures against crime and corruption in more recent years suggest that this point has not been lost upon those who hold political authority in the U.S.S.R.⁵⁶

V. Conclusion

It would be going too far to assume that the mechanisms of adaptation identified in this paper provide an unproblematic, universally applicable formula of government for party leaderships in communist countries. For complex historical and other reasons, the relationship between the population and the regime, and indeed the orientation toward the socialist system generally, is such that in some cases no forms of linkage or consultation are likely to be effective for very long, even when not compounded by insensitive and poorly presented governmental decisions such as the announcement, in Poland, of substantial price rises shortly before Christmas in 1970. There is also the possibility of "blow back";⁵⁷ the danger that forms of consultation originally promoted by the leadership may escape its control, be taken over by the population for its own ends, and ultimately become counterproductive from the point of view of the regime's original purposes. For example, in China, the opportunity to contest elections under the legislation of 1979 led, in 1980, to the election of candidates in Peking, Shanghai, and elsewhere who were not acceptable to the Chinese communist authorities. The elections involved had to be cancelled, presumably with deleterious effects on regime legitimation.⁵⁸ In Romania, the encouragement of workers' letters led to such a volume of complaints that in recent years a new emphasis has been placed upon the "constructive" character that is expected of such communications and upon the "power of positive thinking." As a consequence, even though the food supply was generally regarded as having deteriorated in 1983, the number of complaints received by the authorities in this connection was reported to have fallen by 32 percent.⁵⁹

In Poland, as noted earlier, the rapid enrollment of workers into the

⁵⁶ See White (fn. 53), 57-60.
⁵⁷ I owe this term to Peter Rutland of the University of Texas at Austin.
party in the 1970s, followed by their equally rapid withdrawal as they encountered an increasing degree of centralization of political authority within the party and blatant privilege and corruption at leading levels, may likewise have produced a different result from that which was presumably intended, increasing rather than reducing cynicism, alienation, and disenchantment.\(^{60}\)

Clearly, then, forms of adaptation or linkage offer no panacea to ruling communist elites; yet they do offer at least some elements of a viable governing formula that party leaderships may employ, in a broadly “Kadarist” manner, to accommodate, propitiate, and incorporate the populations over which they rule. The economic difficulties that such regimes face are serious and likely to persist; but they can be mediated politically by leaderships that can maneuver and initiate, rather than simply respond helplessly to “inexorable” economic forces. It is surely more than a coincidence that those communist regimes which have most fully developed these various forms of linkage or adaptation have been, on the whole, most successful in maintaining political stability in the face of economic adversity. Hungary, for instance, has in recent years been widely regarded as politically the most stable state in Eastern Europe, despite economic difficulties that have necessitated significant price rises and other austerity measures. Yugoslavia has similarly managed to avoid at least generalized political instability in the late 1970s and early 1980s, despite the loss of a charismatic leader and despite economic difficulties perhaps greater than those that have been experienced in any other European country, East or West. (This combination of circumstances has been described as “the Yugoslav miracle.”)\(^{61}\)

It appears, in short, that—despite economic difficulties—the judicious use of the consultative or “feedback” capacities of their systems allows communist leaderships to reduce the risk that popular discontent will assume an explosive form. Mechanisms of adaptation such as those indicated in this paper may allow communist leaders to strengthen the political bases of their legitimacy even though the socioeconomic bases of their support lose some of their effectiveness. The result may not be morally admirable; but, in view of the economic adversity that the communist regimes appear likely to encounter in the remainder of the 1980s and beyond, such mechanisms of political legitimation are likely to acquire still greater significance within the combination of grounds in which their claim to exercise authority is based.

\(^{60}\) Mason (fn. 41), esp. p. 35.