Relations and truthmaking II

Macbride, F. (2011) Relations and truthmaking II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111(1), pp. 161-179. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00304.x)

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.


Can Bradley's Regress be Solved by positing relational tropes as truthmakers? No, no more than Russell's Paradox can be solved by positing Fregean extensions. To call a trope relational is to pack into its essence the relating function it is supposed to perform but without explaining what Bradley's Regress calls into question, viz. the capacity of relations to relate. This problem has been masked from view by the (questionable) assumption that the only genuine ontological problems that can be intelligibly raised are those that can be answered by providing a schedule of truthmakers.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Macbride, Professor Fraser
Authors: Macbride, F.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
ISSN (Online):1467-9264
Published Online:30 August 2011

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record