The best of all possible worlds

Brown, C. and Nagasawa, Y. (2005) The best of all possible worlds. Synthese, 143(3), pp. 309-320.

Full text not currently available from Enlighten.

Publisher's URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118540

Abstract

The Argument from Inferiority holds that our world cannot be the creation of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being; for if it were, it would be the best of all possible worlds, which evidently it is not. We argue that this argument rests on an implausible principle concerning which worlds it is permissible for an omnipotent being to create: roughly, the principle that such a being ought not to create a non-best world. More specifically, we argue that this principle is plausible only if we assume that there is a best element in the set of all possible worlds. However, as we show, there are conceivable scenarios in which that assumption does not hold.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brown, Dr Campbell
Authors: Brown, C., and Nagasawa, Y.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
Publisher:Springer Netherlands
ISSN:0039-7857

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record