The utility of knowledge

Brown, C. (2012) The utility of knowledge. Erkenntnis, 77(2), pp. 155-165. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9296-9)

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Abstract

Recent epistemology has introduced a new criterion of adequacy for analyses of knowledge: such an analysis, to be adequate, must be compatible with the common view that knowledge is better than true belief. One account which is widely thought to fail this test is reliabilism, according to which, roughly, knowledge is true belief formed by reliable process. Reliabilism fails, so the argument goes, because of the "swamping problem". In brief, provided a belief is true, we do not care whether or not it was formed by a reliable process. The value of reliability is "swamped" by the value of truth: truth combined with reliability is no better than truth alone. This paper approaches these issues from the perspective of decision theory. It argues that the "swamping effect" involves a sort of information-sensitivity that is well modelled decision-theoretically. It then employs this modelling to investigate a strategy, proposed by Goldman and Olsson, for saving reliabilism from the swamp, the so-called "conditional probability solution". It concludes that the strategy is only partially successful.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:The final publication is available at link.springer.com
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brown, Dr Campbell
Authors: Brown, C.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Erkenntnis
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0165-0106
ISSN (Online):1572-8420
Published Online:27 July 2011
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2011 Springer
First Published:First published in Erkenntnis 77(2):155-165
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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