Brown, C. (2014) Minding the is-ought gap. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 43(1), pp. 53-69. (doi: 10.1007/s10992-012-9253-3)
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Abstract
The ‘No Ought From Is’ principle (or ‘NOFI’) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior’s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Brown, Dr Campbell |
| Authors: | Brown, C. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Philosophical Logic |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0022-3611 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1573-0433 |
| Published Online: | 16 November 2012 |
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