Codognato, G. and Ghosal, S. (2003) Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 39(5-6), pp. 421-431. (doi: 10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00014-4)
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Abstract
We extend an equivalence theorem proved by Forges and Minelli [Journal of Economic Theory 75 (1997) 388] to a market game, which does not require that a specific commodity is used as money. Under the assumption that the set of commodities is a net, we show an equivalence between the set of allocations generated by self-fulfilling mechanisms and the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations. We construct an example, which shows that this equivalence breaks down when the net assumption fails to hold: in such cases, traders cannot obtain, through a self-fulfilling mechanism, the information revealed by rational expectations equilibrium prices.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Ghosal, Professor Sayantan |
| Authors: | Codognato, G., and Ghosal, S. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Journal of Mathematical Economics |
| ISSN: | 0304-4068 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1873-1538 |
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