Exchange and optimality

Ghosal, S. and Polemarchakis, H.M. (1999) Exchange and optimality. Economic Theory, 13(3), pp. 629-642. (doi:10.1007/s001990050273)

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A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals into two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Ghosal, Professor Sayantan
Authors: Ghosal, S., and Polemarchakis, H.M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Economic Theory
ISSN (Online):1432-0479

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