Ghosal, S. and Polemarchakis, H.M. (1999) Exchange and optimality. Economic Theory, 13(3), pp. 629-642. (doi: 10.1007/s001990050273)
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Abstract
A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals into two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Ghosal, Professor Sayantan |
| Authors: | Ghosal, S., and Polemarchakis, H.M. |
| College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
| Journal Name: | Economic Theory |
| ISSN: | 0938-2259 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1432-0479 |
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