Nash–Walras equilibria

Ghosal, S. and Polemarchakis, H.M. (1997) Nash–Walras equilibria. Research in Economics, 51(1), pp. 31-40. (doi:10.1006/reec.1996.0034)

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Abstract

At a Nash–Walras equilibrium, individuals exchange commodities competitively, and, simultaneously, they interact strategically. Under standard assumptions, Nash–Walras equilibria exist; equilibrium profiles of actions are, typically, determinate but pareto suboptimal, though not constrained pareto suboptimal: a transfer of revenue need not suffice for a pareto improvement in welfare.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Ghosal, Professor Sayantan
Authors: Ghosal, S., and Polemarchakis, H.M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Research in Economics
ISSN:1090-9443

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