Competition, quality and contract compliance: evidence from compulsory competitive tendering in local government in Great Britain, 1987-2000

Milne, R. G., Roy, G. and Angeles, L. (2012) Competition, quality and contract compliance: evidence from compulsory competitive tendering in local government in Great Britain, 1987-2000. Fiscal Studies, 33(4), pp. 513-546. (doi: 10.1111/j.1475-5890.2012.00171.x)

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Abstract

The introduction of competition has frequently been found to cause costs to fall. There has, however, been a question as to whether this was partly achieved at the cost of quality. Auction theory predicts prices would fall more the greater the competition to provide the service. There has been some debate about whether the smaller budgets would make contract compliance more difficult. Evidence is found in support of this hypothesis. We also find some evidence that the better recorded performance of the in-house direct service organisations (DSOs) during this period was due to the information advantage they had from being incumbents.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Roy, Professor Graeme and Milne, Mr Robin and Angeles, Professor Luis
Authors: Milne, R. G., Roy, G., and Angeles, L.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Fiscal Studies
Publisher:Wiley
ISSN:0143-5671
ISSN (Online):1475-5890
Published Online:06 December 2012
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2012 The Authors / Institute for Fiscal Studies
First Published:First published in Fiscal Studies 33(4):513-546
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher

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