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Hungary and the European Union: The Political Implications of Societal Security Promotion

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Abstract

Hungary’s constitutional commitment to support kin-nationals beyond its borders (nation policy) has been a central feature of its post-1989 foreign policy and highlights a particularly important national security concern – the societal security of national identity, culture, language and tradition. This article examines Hungary’s societal security concerns and the policy methods it utilises, including its EU membership and the promotion of minority rights at the European level, to help combat these concerns. It is suggested that Hungary has found it somewhat difficult to balance its societal security policy objective with internal economic demands on its welfare system and external foreign policy objective to maintain good neighbourly relations. This article also notes that Hungary’s attempts to Europeanise, or rather ‘EU-ise’, minority and ethnic rights issues as a means to enhance societal security for the Hungarian nation has certain political consequences for the EU. This suggests that societal security provision is an issue that cannot be overlooked when trying to understand the longer-term implications of EU eastern enlargement.

Keywords

Hungary, European Union, Enlargement, Societal Security, Minority Rights

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WHEN IT COMES TO IDENTIFYING AND ANALYSING THE DRIVING FORCES of European Union (EU) accession for the ‘class of 2004’ EU member-states, few scholars would deny the importance of ‘national interest’. Moravcsik and Vachudová (2003) actually argue that national interest is the single most important issue when it comes to understanding EU accession. A wide range of issues can be defined as being of national interest and in order to establish what these are, it is useful to place national interest within the context of security. This is possible because national interest is a central concept of international relations (IR) where it is often associated with or related to security issues. Within the sub-IR field of security studies it is now generally accepted that security encompasses numerous different sectors beyond its traditional military one (see Mathews 1989, Booth 1991, Deighton 2000). Some of the most influential work on widening the conceptualisation of security was undertaken by a group of scholars, collectively known as the Copenhagen School, including Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver among others. The Copenhagen School argued two things: firstly, security encompasses five key sectors; these being military, economic, political, environmental and societal security (see Buzan 1991 & 1997; Buzan, Wæver and deWilde 1998) and secondly, that in addition to the ‘state’, ‘societies’ in the form of ‘large, self-sustaining groups’ can also be a referent object of security (Buzan et al. 1998, p.119; see also Wæver et al. 1993). While by no means authoritative and not without its critics, this widened conceptualisation of security, particularly the multi-sector aspect, has been enthusiastically adopted by all the Central and East European countries (CEECs) that have either recently acceded to the EU or remain candidates for membership and it has influenced all of their respective national security strategy documents (Bulgaria 2004; Croatia 2002; Czech Republic 2003; Estonia 2004; Hungary 2004; Latvia 2002; Lithuania 2002; Macedonia 2003; Poland 2003; Slovakia 2001; Slovenia 2001; Romania 2005). It also reflects what these various CEECs deem to be of national interest and, therefore, has particular implications for understanding the EU accession strategies of the CEECs and the potential impact eastern enlargement may have for EU policy development.

The use of sectors to analyse EU enlargement is not new and it has traditionally been argued, that the predominant national interest rationales driving the CEECs’ quest for EU membership can be divided along economic, political and hard security lines. For example, economic national interest is met by improved access to EU subsidies and direct funding, as well as by the perceived economic stability associated with being an EU member, which encourages investor confidence and, therefore,
potentially greater foreign direct investment. Political national interest is met by the financial, legal
and strategic benefits of EU common policy on combating political and economic corruption,
transnational organised crime and terrorism, as well as by the perceived political stability provided by
membership based on the political requirements of the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria. Hard security
interests benefit from the developing Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) and
the implied military security guarantee of EU membership, which suggests that even though there is no
legal or actual basis of guaranteed support from other EU members for a fellow member state that had
come under attack, it is highly unlikely that the union, as a whole, would not provide some form of
military support. These are undoubtedly important rationales and their place within the literature on
EU accession is not being questioned. However, it is suggested here that these dominant rationales do
not allow for a complete picture of the EU eastern enlargement process. By focusing solely on these
dominant or established national interest rationale sectors, other national interest-led driving forces of
accession are neglected. Therefore, any implications these may have for the individual member states,
as well as for the enlargement process or the development of EU policy or the EU as an organisation,
may be overlooked. Using the Copenhagen School multi-sector approach as a framework for analysis
it is possible to identify societal security as one such additional, national interest-led issue.

Societal security is defined within security studies literature as the ‘sustainability, within
acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and
national identity and custom’ (Buzan 1991, p.20). Societal issues, such as national or religious
identity, are relevant for security, particularly in terms of violent conflict. Events, such as the ethnic-
cleansing that took place in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s or the religious sectarian and
nationalist undertones of the ‘Irish Troubles’ are but two examples of how societal issues can impact
on security in Europe. Despite a clear connection between societal issues and security, criticisms
concerning the concept have been made. Wæver’s (1993, p.23) suggestion that the main units of
analysis (the referent objects) of societal security are ‘politically significant ethno-national and
religious entities’ has been subject to particular criticism from those who take a more ‘realist’ view of
security and argue that the state is the main referent object. Such criticisms could also be raised about
the use of societal security in this study of EU enlargement; after all it is ‘the state’, and not society,
that is perceived to be the main driving force behind EU enlargement. This is not, however, as
problematic an issue as it first appears. Despite suggestions to the contrary, the Copenhagen School
never claimed that it was trying to create two distinct, separate entities that, as referent objects of security, function independently of each other; rather, they recognised that society and the state are linked. This is particularly so when viewed in a national context where the state and the nation come together due to the state often taking a key role in representing the security of the nation. Buzan et al. (1998, p.41) argue this by stressing that ‘societal security is often about nations and their survival’, and that this does not mean ‘that a nation acts to defend itself’, because this would ‘represent reifying and anthropomorphic terminology’. Rather, they continue, ‘some group, movement, party or elite, including a state government would usually act with reference to the nation and claim to speak or act on behalf of the nation’. In this sense, a nation is often reliant upon a state for its security and it is for this reason that states are often wrongfully confused with nations; they are not the same entity, although they may seek the same goal. This is particularly important within CEE, where the borders of states and nations are far from congruent. It is this notion that a state can represent a social group, such as a nation, that allows societal security to be used as a valid factor of analysis when examining the rationales for and implications of European eastern enlargement.

There is a long-standing relationship between European integration and societal security, particularly in terms of seeking non-violent solutions to societal security threats. The Council of Europe (COE) and the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for example, have been ardent advocates of non-violent societal security solutions, such as the promotion of national and ethnic minority rights. Minority rights has also played an important role within the security provisions of the EU enlargement process and is well documented within literature on enlargement where it is commonly accepted to be representative of a top-down policy transfer imposed by the EU, through the Copenhagen Criteria, upon CEECs as a prerequisite for accession that is necessary to prevent conflict or political instability, stemming from national or ethnic differences in CEE, spilling over into the EU (see Amato & Batt 1998; OSI-EUMAP 2001, 2002; Smith 2002; Vermeersch 2004). From this perspective, the relationship between societal security and enlargement seems to adhere to a traditional realist conceptualisation of security whereby the EU and its constituent members, as geo-political entities, are the referent objects. However, this is not the only way that societal security has impacted the EU enlargement debate.

Using Hungary as a case study, this article will show that obtaining societal security for an identity based group, the Hungarian nation, can be viewed as a valid national interest rationale for
membership of the EU. This is important as it has implications for the way we understand EU enlargement and the relationship between the EU and its member states, particularly its newer members. For example, it is argued in this article that EU membership offers very specific benefits to Hungary in terms of enhancing its societal security interests. It is also argued that in addition to these benefits there is scope for a number of problems to arise, for both Hungary and the EU, which have not as yet been fully addressed within the current literature on enlargement. By examining societal security as a policy issue or national interest rationale within the context of Hungary’s accession to the EU this article will go some way towards raising awareness of these problematic political implications.

Hungary and Societal Security

Hungary was one of the first CEECs to adopt a multi-sector approach to its national security. In a statement by the Hungarian Ministry of Defence (Dessewfy and Hammer 1995, Appendix) it notes that Hungary’s concept of security is not restricted to military security, but includes ‘politics, economics, human and minority rights, and cultural and ecological factors’. This was reinforced by Hungary’s ‘National Security Strategy’ (2004) which categorically states that Hungary’s national interests are placed within the broader definition of security: ‘The Republic of Hungary defines security in a comprehensive way: besides the traditional political and defence components, it also contains, inter alia, economic and social elements, including human rights and minority rights-related, as well as environmental elements’.\(^1\) This broad definition is reflected in the ten national security interests listed within Hungary’s ‘National Security Strategy’.\(^2\) Three of these national security interests make specific reference to aspects of societal security. These are: (1) human rights and fundamental freedoms; (2) social and cultural development; and (3) the rights of [ethnic] Hungarians living in neighbouring countries.

As with many states, Hungary’s guardianship of societal security is an historic legacy which can be traced back to the rise of nationalism in Europe from the early nineteenth-century. Twentieth-

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2 see footnote 1.
century events have further highlighted the significance of societal security for the Hungarian nation and encouraged the Hungarian state to play a particularly active role in combating societal security threats. It is important to recognise the difference between the Hungarian nation and the Hungarian state. As a state, Hungary has a population of 10 million people of which around 90% is estimated to be ethnic-Hungarian. However, the population of the Hungarian nation extends over a much greater territory than that occupied by the Hungarian state. There are estimates that suggest as many as 15 million people of ethnic-Hungarian origin live throughout the CEE region, although official government census reports put this at closer to 12.5 million. This means that at least 2.5 million ethnic-Hungarians live in the neighbouring countries of Romania (1,431,807), Slovakia (520,528), Serbia (293,299), Ukraine (156,600), Austria (40,583), Slovenia (6,243) and Croatia (16,595). This makes ethnic-Hungarians the second largest ethnic group in Europe to live outside the borders of the national kin-state. Only the estimated 15.1 million strong ethnic-Russian diaspora is larger (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998, p.8).

There are two main reasons for the widespread population of ethnic-Hungarians. The first is the economic migration which took place at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The second, and more significant reason, relates to signing of the ‘Treaty of Peace Between The Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary: Protocol and Declaration’ (Trianon Treaty) at Versailles on 4 June 1920 which resulted in Hungary losing of 71% of its pre-war territory and 62%


of its population, almost half of which was made up of ethnic-Hungarians.\(^5\) Kiss (2000, p.87) describes the imposition of Trianon as a trauma on the Hungarian nation and suggests that it instituted not only the ‘loss of capacity for political and economic action’ within the Hungarian psyche, but also encouraged Hungary to view itself as a victim of the allied powers – replacing its status as a ‘pseudo-Great Power’ with that of an insignificant ‘small state’.

Following a period of interwar irredentism, the consolidation of Communism across much of CEE during the late 1940s and into the 1950s, led Hungary to adopt a policy of non-involvement with regard to the ethnic-Hungarian diaspora. This policy, however, began to change in the 1970s and 1980s with the growth in traditional Hungarian cultural interests by the general public and ethnic-Hungarian émigré circles within the Hungarian state, and pressure from ethnic-Hungarian groups in neighbouring states, particularly Romania, which were concerned with increasing levels of Romanisation of traditionally settled Hungarian territory. As such, the Hungarian government began to make cautious moves towards taking a more active interest in the affairs of the ethnic-Hungarians diaspora, particularly in terms of promoting cultural links. By the late 1980s, the Hungarian government became more confident of its ability to speak for the ethnic-Hungarian diaspora (Joó & Ludányi 1994, p.74). However, comments, such as that made in 1988 by a senior Hungarian official who stated ‘we consider the Hungarians living beyond our borders as part of our nation and our policy feels responsibility for their fate’, framed Hungary’s diaspora politics around state sovereignty and appeared to directly challenge the authority held by governments of neighbouring states over their citizens.\(^6\) A new era in relations between the Hungarian state and the ethnic-Hungarian diaspora had begun.

The political events of 1989 in CEE intensified Hungary’s involvement with kin-national issues. The Hungarian Constitution (1949) was revised to include a statement of support for the Hungarian diaspora: ‘the Republic of Hungary bears a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians

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living outside its borders and shall promote and foster their relations with Hungary’. This ‘sense of responsibility’ and the commitment enshrined in the constitution defined a particular political direction for Hungary in the immediate post-1989 period. In addition, the desire to move away from its socialist image encouraged Hungarian political leaders to adopt strong nationalist overtones to their rhetoric. For example, in an obvious reference to the inclusion of those ethnic-Hungarians in neighbouring states, József Antall famously commented on how he considered himself to be Prime Minister ‘emotionally as well as spiritually of 15 million Hungarians’ (The Economist 1993, p.18). The former government minister, Géza Entz, also commented on how all Hungarians outside Hungary’s borders are considered to be an integral part of the Hungarian nation (Van den Doel 1996, p.57) and although the Foreign Minister at the time, Géza Jeszenszky, ruled out the possibility of any border change by force, he refused to do the same for possible border changes by peaceful means (Horváth 2002, p.35). The governments of neighbouring countries immediately criticized these comments for their revisionist overtones (Ieda 2004, p.9). At the same time, organisations representing ethnic-Hungarians outside Hungary regarded the comments coming from Hungary’s post-communist elite as a positive move towards improving the situation of ethnic-Hungarian minorities beyond the borders.

The Antall government of 1990-1994 re-orientated Hungarian foreign policy to take greater account of those ethnic-Hungarians living beyond the borders of the Hungarian state. This contributed, in part, to a growing recognition of minority rights and ethnic issues within the government policies of most post-communist states. For example, Romania (1991 – Article 7), Slovenia (1991 – Article 5), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1991 – Article 49), Croatia (1991 – Article 10), Ukraine (1996 – Article 12), Poland (1997 – Article 6) and Slovakia (2001 – Article 7a) all amended their constitutions to include a reference to kin-nationals beyond their borders (Venice Commission 2001, pp.3-5). This highlights the fact that the minority kin-national issue was not restricted to Hungary, although Hungary was, undoubtedly, the forerunner with regard to kin-national or diaspora concerns.

One of the ways in which Hungary approached the problem of kin-nationals was to incorporate the issue into its foreign policy. Hungary introduced a triple-priority foreign policy which consisted of three overlapping policies. These were: (1) a commitment to support kin-nationals living

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in neighbouring states (‘nation policy’ – nemzeti politika); (2) the maintenance of good neighbourly relations; and (3) a commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. Despite the fact that all three sub-policy areas were supposed to be equal in status, internal government preferences, as well as pressure from external and internal organisations representing ethnic-Hungarians, favoured the nation policy above the other sub-policies. This essentially allowed a hierarchy within the triple priorities to develop, which, in turn, created a precedent for the promotion of ethnic-Hungarian minority issues within the political system of the Hungarian state.

Although the intention of the nation policy was to provide support for ethnic-Hungarians beyond the borders in accordance with international law, this was never fully explained by the Antall government, as evidenced by the ambiguity of Jeszenszky’s comments on border changes. Antall also demanded complete political autonomy and co-nation status for ethnic-Hungarians living in neighbouring states and instituted a policy whereby the Hungarian state actively sought the agreement of organisations representing ethnic-Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states on all decisions that could potentially affect them. This provided minority organisations with an effective, if unofficial, veto over Hungarian state relations with its neighbouring countries and as such afforded these organisations a significant degree of influence over the development of an important area of government policy.

This influence was recognised by the Gyula Horn-led MSZP-SZDSZ coalition government of 1994-1998, which took a different approach to kin-nationals, severely criticising the Antall administration’s overemphasis of the ethnic-Hungarian minority situation. He claimed that the minority question was now counterproductive for Hungary in terms of its move towards European integration, particularly as the EU and NATO were increasingly urging CEECs to resolve outstanding territorial and minority issues (Horváth 2002, p.42). Horn therefore limited state support for kin-nationals to the promotion of cultural autonomy and ties with cultural groups and organisations. In addition, bi-lateral treaties, which recognised the legitimacy of the borders and renounced any territorial claims, were signed by Hungary with Slovakia (1995) and Romania (1996). However, these developments led to severe criticism from opposition parties, which claimed that the Horn Government had subordinated the minority-status issues of the Hungarian diaspora in favour of European integration. This highlights the fact that the Antall government’s promotion of minority concerns had established a precedent within Hungarian politics, which all subsequent Hungarian governments have
had to address and are unable to ignore. This was clearly evidenced by the speeches of Péter Medgyessy and Victor Orbán following the 2002 general election results. The centre-right 1998-2002 Orbán-led Fidesz-MDF government had placed considerable emphasis on minority issues during its time in office, particular in terms of dealing with issues raised by EU accession. When the MSZP-SZDSZ coalition won the 2002 election, Medgyessy announced that he would be the Prime Minister for all 10 million Hungarians. Orbán was quick to remind Medgyessy of the diaspora issue by declaring in his resignation speech that ‘the future of Hungary lies not in the Hungary of 10 million but in the Hungarian nation of 15 million’ (Stewart 2002, p.2).

Orbán’s declaration could be viewed as mere political rhetoric; a useful and easy political card to play, for a man who had suddenly found himself in governmental opposition. But, even if this were the case, his comments encouraged Medgyessy quickly follow his own reference to being Prime Minister of ‘10 million Hungarians’ by stating that he also felt ‘responsible for the 15 million Hungarians’ (Stewart 2002, p.2). Although Medgyessy’s comment merely reflected Article 6.3 of the Hungarian Constitution, he echoed both Orbán and Antall by reinforcing the rhetorical commitment, thereby keeping the minority kin-national issue high on the Hungarian political agenda.

This rhetorical commitment was upheld by the Hungarian Standing Conference, a regular meeting of all of Hungary’s political parties, all Hungarian political parties from abroad which had elected representatives, the Hungarian World Alliance and the Hungarian Government, and which noted in its first joint statement (1999) that ‘[e]thnic-Hungarians beyond Hungary’s borders are citizens of other countries. At the same time, based on ties of a common language, culture, history and sense of identity, they are part of the Hungarian nation’. For Hungary, societal security (the preservation of national identity) is clearly of fundamental interest, regardless of whether it is expressed in a direct (such as during the Antall and Orbán administrations) or more considered (such as during the Horn and Medgyessy/Gyurcsány administrations) manner. With societal security established as an important

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8 The Hungarian Standing Conference (MAÉRT) held its first meeting in 1999 (during the Viktor Orbán led Fidesz-MDF administration). It had no actual political authority and was primarily intended to allow various groups with an interest in the preservation of Hungarian national identity to come together to discuss and inform the development of various aspects of Hungarian nation policy, such as the Status Law. It met for seven sessions between 1999 and 2003. As of 2006, Hungarian Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, declared that the MAÉRT would no longer meet.
concept within Hungarian politics it is not surprising that certain post-1989 events (which could be construed as societal security threats) have had an impact on the development of Hungarian government policy.

**Hungarian Societal Security Threats**

The Hungarian nation faces a number of threats to its societal security. Many of these direct threats stem from political events in countries with large ethnic-Hungarian populations. For example, in the case of Romania, there was a continued rise in nationalist Romanian sentiment during the 1990s, as could be seen by the growth of hard-line nationalist parties such as the Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) and the Greater Romania People’s Party (PPRM). This created a perceived political threat for the ethnic-Hungarian population in Romania, particularly in the Transylvanian city of Cluj/Kolosvár, where the Romanian-nationalist campaign of former PUNR leader and Mayor of the city, Gheorghe Funar, created a sustained unease and discontent. In addition, the success of the ultra-nationalist Corneliu Vadim Tudor in qualifying for the run-offs in the 2000/2001 presidential election in Romania (McAleer 2000, p.12), also alarmed Romania’s ethnic-Hungarian population, leading to ‘a ten-fold increase in calls’ to the Hungarian consulate in Cluj/Kolosvár ‘from people wanting to know how they can get out’ of Romania (McAleer 2000, p.12). This may have been an over-reaction on the part of ethnic-Hungarians at the time – particularly as Tudor did not win the election – it nevertheless suggests that nationalist tendencies in Romania should not be overlooked when trying to explain ethnic-Hungarian migration.

The political situation in the former Yugoslavia has been a constant source of societal security threat for Hungary, encouraging migration and asylum applications among the ethnic-Hungarian diaspora in Vojvodina which have, in turn, contributed to the overall decline in the province’s ethnic-Hungarian population. According to the 2002 census for the Republic of Serbia, there were 290,207 ethnic-Hungarians residing in Vojvodina. This represents a decline of 49,284 based on the 1991 census. This decline in the population of ethnic-Hungarians in Vojvodina is paralleled by a growth in

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the number of ethnic-Serbs in the province. In addition there have been considerable changes to the political institutions of Vojvodina, which have reduced the level of participation ethnic-Hungarians can have in local government and other forms of public life.

The development of intense Serb nationalism in the late 1980s and the rise of Slobodan Milošević in 1989, following the so-called ‘yoghurt revolution’, led to the removal of Vojvodina’s autonomous status, which had been granted in 1943, and its incorporation into the new Serbian Republic. This meant that important issues for Vojvodina’s ethnic-Hungarian population, such as education and the media, which had been the remit of the provincial Vojvodina parliament, were now in the control of the increasingly centralised federal government in Belgrade. This effectively removed the voice of ethnic-Hungarians from the political decision-making process and led senior Hungarian figures in Vojvodina to accuse the Serb-dominated government in Belgrade of discrimination, particularly in areas such as education and the allocation of political and economic posts.10 Concern about the apparent Serb disregard for minority representation was also raised within Hungary, particularly over education and the ‘concerted campaign by the authorities in Belgrade to discourage Hungarian-language schools in Vojvodina’ (Carpenter and Kislitsyn 1997, p.3).

The outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia in 1991 further exacerbated tensions between Budapest and Belgrade, leading to concerns over a rise in incidents of human-rights abuse, including the forced eviction or ‘ethnic cleansing’ of non-Serbs (Hungarian and Croat) from their homes. Although the situation in Vojvodina never reached the scale of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo, there was a constant fear that the civil war could escalate in Vojvodina leading to an influx of refugees to Hungary who would be unable to return home at the war’s end. It has been estimated that some 250-300,000 ethnic-Serb refugees were resettled in Vojvodina during the 1990s.11 Such large numbers of relocated Serbs created two societal security problems for Hungary: firstly, it led to a changing demographic balance within a traditionally Hungarian settled territory and secondly, it increased considerable ethnic tensions within the province.

Despite the end of the Yugoslav wars, pressure from the Hungarian press and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (HHRF), has

10 see footnote 6.
forced the Hungarian government to continue to carefully monitor the situation of ethnic-Hungarians in Vojvodina. For example, in August 2004, following reports in the Hungarian press of increasing levels of anti-Hungarian incidents such as harassment, intimidation and physical assaults; discrimination; the desecration of cemeteries; vandalism of property; the proliferation of racist, xenophobic graffiti and vandalism of multi-lingual signs, the then Hungarian Foreign Minister, Laszlo Kovács, sent a letter to the Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, calling on Belgrade to put an end the ‘atrocities’ against the Vojvodina Hungarians.12 Kovács again used the term ‘atrocities’ in an article published in the Hungarian daily newspaper, Nepszabadsag, on 8 September 2004.13 Although it is questionable as to whether or not these incidents could be regarded as ‘atrocities’ (a word that is usually used in the context of extremely serious events), it is clear that its use was representative of how serious the Hungarian government viewed the situation.

Political events such as those in Romania and Serbia mainly impact upon Hungarian societal security by way of encouraging political emigration from territory traditionally settled by ethnic-Hungarians. When taken into consideration with absorption into host nations via the cultural homogenisation nation state strategies of Hungary’s neighbours, economic emigration and falling birth rates it becomes clear that demographic changes do have a negative impact on Hungarian societal security. Throughout the Carpathian Basin region there has been a substantial rise in the number of non ethnic-Hungarians and a fall in the population of ethnic-Hungarians. For example, according to census data for the geographical region that currently includes Transylvania, Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, Slovakia and Vojvodina the ethnic-Hungarian population has fallen from 31% to 15% of the total population between 1910 and 2001/2002 (see table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>7,300,000</th>
<th>5,400,000</th>
<th>2,000,000</th>
<th>1,255,000</th>
<th>15,955,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


Table 1: Population decline of ethnic-Hungarians between 1910 and 2001/2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Transylvania</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
<th>Sub-Carpathian Ukraine</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Ethnic-Hungarians</td>
<td>1,662,000</td>
<td>884,000</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>183,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>5,300,000</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>601,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>Ethnic-Hungarians</td>
<td>1,437,000</td>
<td>521,000</td>
<td>290,000</td>
<td>152,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>7,300,000</td>
<td>5,400,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,255,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most immigration into Hungary is by ethnic-Hungarians from Romania, Vojvodina and the Ukraine and as such can be described as ‘intra-national’ (Fox 2004, p.2; see also: Wallace 2002, p.612; Kovats 2003, p.2; Fox 2003, pp.449-451). Ethnic-Hungarians from Slovakia tend not to emigrate because they are generally better off, economically ( Hárs 2001, p.124). This ‘intra-national’ movement of ethnic-Hungarians and the subsequent fall in the population of ethnic-Hungarians and rise in the population of non-Hungarians is often perceived to represent a demise of Hungarian cultural influence throughout traditionally populated or settled Hungarian territories. As Kósa (2003) notes: ‘Some Hungarian politicians…envisage and threaten that the declining population will result in “the merciless demise of the nation”’. Hungary is keen that traditional ethnic-Hungarian territories remain populated with Hungarians as a means to ensure the continuation of Hungarian culture, language, religious traditions, national identity and customs. To this end, Hungary encourages ethnic-Hungarians to remain in their homelands. Hungary’s ‘National Security Strategy’ clearly notes that ‘Hungary supports the concept, according to which Hungarians living in neighbouring countries must enjoy forms of self-government and autonomy that best fit their particular situation and the rights deriving from them, in accordance with European practice, as a community, remaining in their native lands’ [emphasis added].14

14 ‘Article III.2.2’, The National Security Strategy, for full details see footnote 1.
The problem for Hungary is that even though such migrants provide for an easily integrated and much needed workforce, they also pose a potential economic burden on the Hungarian state through increased healthcare and social welfare costs. As such, Hungary may be using societal security for ethnic-Hungarian minorities and Hungarian culture as a smokescreen to cover its own policy to discourage large-scale economic migration into Hungary. Ironically, despite this possible economic explanation for Hungary’s attempt to dissuade immigration, the very emphasis Hungary places on national connections and the rhetorical claims of a greater Hungarian nation actually encourages the migration of ethnic-Hungarians into Hungary. This suggests that the Hungarian government is faced with a problem in terms of balancing its constitutional commitment to the Hungarian diaspora with its governmental duties and electoral commitment to Hungarian citizens to ensure economic stability and adherence to a government budget.

The December 2004 referendum on the provision of dual citizenship for ethnic-Hungarians living abroad clearly highlighted this problem. The referendum was proposed by the World Federation of Hungarians (Magyarok Világszövetsége - MVSZ), an NGO dedicated to the promotion of ethnic-Hungarian minority rights. The MVSZ was able to call the referendum because it collected the signatures of the necessary 200,000 registered Hungarian voters needed to request a ballot. The Hungarian MSZP-SZDSZ government led by Ferenc Gyurcsány, campaigned for a ‘no’ vote in the referendum. Appealing to the pocket of the Hungarian voter, Gyurcsány claimed that by offering dual citizenship, Hungary was risking the immigration of some 800,000 ethnic-Hungarians from Romania, the Ukraine and Serbia, which would require ‘an additional $2.9 billion in welfare expenditures each year’. Although a majority of 51.6% of those who voted in the referendum voted yes, the referendum was declared void due to the fact that only 37% of eligible voters cast a ballot, meaning that officially the referendum had the support of only 19.1% of eligible voters. For the referendum to have been successful the question would have to have been supported by at least 25% of eligible voters. Government opinion and public actions appear to reveal that, despite claims about the greater

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Hungarian nation, a perceived sense of Hungarian national unity does not supersede the fiscal situation of the Hungarian state.

Although Hungary is keen to dissuade permanent migration of its kin-nationals, it also recognises the importance of temporary economic migration in terms of allowing ethnic-Hungarians from neighbouring states an opportunity to earn extra money and to enhance family, educational and cultural links. Hungary’s EU accession, however, has raised a problem with regard to this movement of ethnic-Hungarians between the Hungarian state and their homelands. Basically, the problem lies in the fact that the open borders of the internal EU are also contrasted with strictly guarded external borders; in the case of Hungary, its once permeable borders have become subject to the restrictive measures of the Schengen acquis, which requires the upgrading of external frontier controls, the imposition of checks on cross border movement of persons and goods, as well as the need for visas to enter the EU. Although the UK and Ireland were able to opt out of incorporating Schengen into their legal systems, this option is not open to new CEE member-states.

It can be argued that the tighter borders of the Schengen area benefit Hungary, considering that it has proven itself keen to dissuade ethnic-Hungarian migration. However, the reality is that this is not the case; as mentioned above Hungary has never had any intention of closing its borders to cross border movement altogether, particularly with regard to ethnic-Hungarians who play an important role in terms of both the maintenance of cultural links and Hungary’s economy. Due to its aging population and falling birth-rate, Hungary is, in fact, in need of immigrants. Ethnic-Hungarians from beyond the border provide a source of labour that is highly skilled and relatively easily integrated. Therefore, Hungary encourages migrant workers so long as they remain temporary or seasonal workers who return home and do not become permanent residents within Hungary; hence the Hungarian government’s concern about offering dual citizenship. It is not in Hungary’s interest to close its borders completely. However, moves by Hungary to implement the Schengen acquis have created difficulties for ethnic-Hungarians living in non-EU candidate states, such as the Ukraine and Serbia, concerning the ease with which they were once able to cross the border in order to work or to visit relatives. These people now need a visa and often face the task of travelling greater distances to official border-crossing points.

*Traditional Solutions to Hungarian Societal Security Threats*
Traditionally Hungary has attempted to deal with threats to its societal security through the introduction of kin-national policy initiatives that emphasise mainly cultural support, and extensive use of bi-lateral treaties with its neighbouring states as a means to enhance good relations ‘based on mutual confidence and common interests’.16 A key example of Hungarian policy initiative in this area is the June 2001 ‘Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries’ (Status Law) which, as of January 2005, has been updated as the ‘National Responsibility Programme’. The Status Law was primarily designed to deal with the problems raised by Hungary’s adoption of the Schengen acquis, thus providing ethnic-Hungarians living in neighbouring states with easier access to the educational, cultural, and, to a lesser extent, economic resources of Hungary after its full admittance to the EU.17 It allows kin-nationals to apply for free, multiple-trip visas which permit them to enter Hungary but not the rest of the EU, as well as an ethnic-Hungarian identity card to allow them to work temporarily, study, travel cheaply and claim certain healthcare benefits while in Hungary. In turn this would, it has been argued, lead to a reduction in the number of kin-nationals living and working illegally in Hungary. The Status Law, by its nature, cannot be applied to an EU member state because it promotes discrimination between one group of citizens and another, based on racial or ethnic origin. In June 2000, the EU passed the Council Directive (2000/43/EC), which implemented the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (EC 2000a, pp.22-26). It was this notion of discrimination, albeit positive discrimination, that resulted in the Status Law being described as ‘anti-European’ because it appeared to ‘go against the trends in the EU to create a more open society, in which, at least in theory, ethnicity and nationality are not criteria for any kind of discrimination’.18 However, the EU’s prohibition of the ethnic discrimination of EU citizens does not extend to associate-member states (which Hungary was at the time). Therefore, the law, prior to


18 see footnote 17.
Hungary’s EU accession, did not contravene EU regulations on discrimination. Nevertheless, the EU remained concerned that the Status Law could aggravate political tensions between Hungary and its neighbouring states, particularly EU candidates, Slovakia and Romania. With the change in government in Hungary in 2002, moves were made to bring the Status Law into line with EU regulations and to make it less controversial for its neighbouring states. In the case of Romania, both states settled their differences over the Status Law by renegotiating their bi-lateral treaty and agreeing to extend the benefits to all Romanians, whether ethnic-Hungarian or not. In the case of Slovakia, the Status Law became void (in accordance with EU regulation on discrimination) when both states acceded to the EU on 1 May 2004; this is now also the case with Romania following its accession to the EU on 1 January 2007.

The June 2005 ‘National Responsibility Programme’ built on the Status Law and consists of five key elements, not all of which have been to date fully implemented; these include: (1) a homeland programme package, which came into force in June 2005 and promotes the economic development necessary to allow ethnic-Hungarians to remain in their homeland; (2) a national visa programme, which came into force in January 2006 and provides free extended stay visas for those wishing to visit Hungary to preserve their language, cultural or national identity, or to cultivate family ties; (3) a programme of quick and fair naturalisation for those wishing to settle in Hungary and obtain Hungarian citizenship which came into force in January 2006; (4) an ongoing integration and autonomy programme to encourage and promote the development of self-government within the context of devolution and EU integration; and (5) the development of a special form of national citizenship which will provide ethnic-Hungarians who do not hold Hungarian citizenship with limited rights and benefits both within and outside of the Hungarian state, and although this aspect of the National Responsibility Programme is still undergoing consultation, it should finally determine the legal status of ethnic-Hungarians beyond the border within the context of the Hungarian nation.19

The Status Law and the ‘National Responsibility Program’ were designed with a dual purpose in mind: first, to allow Hungary to continue to benefit from mobile, easily integrated and skilled,

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ethnic-Hungarian workers from neighbouring states; and second, to provide short-term periods of work and educational support for ethnic-Hungarian migrants with the express intention that they return to their original homeland. This ensures the continuation of a Hungarian presence in these homelands, thus providing a degree of societal security for the Hungarian nation as a whole, while at the same time removing the responsibility of the Hungarian state to provide potentially high levels of long-term welfare support to immigrant workers.

While policy initiatives such as the Status law have proven controversial for Hungary, it has had more success with its use of bi-lateral state treaties on ‘Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation’. Hungary has signed such treaties with most of its neighbouring states; Ukraine (1991), Slovenia (1992), Croatia (1992), Slovakia (1995), Romania (1996) and the most recent was signed with the Republic of Serbia in 2007. The problem with bi-lateral treaties is that they are, as Kovács states, ‘based on mutual confidence’. Hungary has no way of legally enforcing such treaties; it is entirely dependant upon the second country maintaining commitments to ethnic-Hungarian rights. It is for this reason that bi-lateral treaties have never been considered to go far enough, either by the political elite (particularly those on the political right) or by politically vocal ethnic-Hungarian minority populations in neighbouring states. This is because these treaties can not guarantee that the civil, human and cultural rights of those ethnic-Hungarians living in neighbouring countries will not be subject to changes in government, policies and laws within the state of which they are citizens.

One of the ways Hungary has attempted to overcome the societal security problems it faces is via European integration. This was reiterated by László Kovács in a speech at Columbia University: ‘[t]he Hungarian Government is also aware that the situation of Hungarians living in neighbouring countries will only be settled in a long-lasting and reassuring manner within the framework of European integration’. For Hungary, European integration not only means working in conjunction with those European organisations that traditionally deal with societal security issues, such as minority rights provision (namely the COE and OSCE), but also it increasingly refers to the EU.

*The European Union and Societal Security Provision*

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20 see footnote 16.
21 see footnote 16.
Aspects of societal security provision, mainly related to the promotion of fundamental rights, can be found within the EU. For example, EU membership was, in part, promoted as a potential means to prevent violent conflict between various ethnic populations of the CEECs, such as that which took place in the Balkans. As such, the EU made specific reference to ethnic minority rights, as an aspect of fundamental rights, within its Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession: ‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities…’ [emphasis added] (EC 1993, p.13). By including this statement within the Copenhagen Criteria ‘the EU sharply accentuated the role of minority protection in the enlargement process hoping that by doing so it would be able to maintain political stability throughout the future territory of the union in Central Europe’ (Vermeersch 2004, p.7).

Throughout the accession process, the EU monitored the situation of ethnic minorities in CEECs and incorporated its findings into its annual reports on the accession states. The EU also re-emphasised the importance of minority rights in its ‘Laeken Declaration’ which stated that ‘The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human rights. The Union is open only to countries which uphold basic values such as free elections, respect for minorities and respect for the rule of law’, thus making minority rights a specific pre-requisite for accession.22

In addition, the EU has made a number of moves, over the past five years, to enhance its support for fundamental human rights. These include the development of: (1) a procedure, as set out in the Treaty of Amsterdam, to deal with member states in breach of fundamental rights, including the possibility that such states could have their voting rights within the Council suspended; (2) the ‘Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ (CFREU) (EC 2000c) a political declaration which was signed on 7 December 2000 at Nice, but which is not, as yet, legally binding for EU member states and (3) an extended remit for the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia to create a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights which came into being on the 1 March 2007 (EC 2005).23 By championing fundamental rights, including the promotion of minority rights in CEECs

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23 It is important to acknowledge that the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) and the European Convention on Human Rights are two different documents from two separate organisations – the EU and the Council of Europe.
(through accession negotiations and the stability pact) and anti-discriminatory legislation, the EU offers, albeit indirectly, some form of societal security.

There are, however, three important points to note at this stage. Firstly, although the EU requires ‘respect’ for minorities it did not set particular criteria or standards for candidate states, basing its opinions rather on the degree to which the candidate states interpreted their own minority rights legislation or implemented the standards of other organisations, such as the Council of Europe (COE). Secondly, once a state becomes a member of the EU, there is no specific legal requirement for it to continue to implement minority rights; it has been suggested in a report by the EU Accession Monitoring Programme of the Open Society Institute (OSI-EUMAP 2002, p.17) that some candidate state governments ‘have viewed their efforts to demonstrate compliance with the political criteria instrumentally, rather than as a genuine and permanent commitment’. The fact that there is no requirement for the EU to monitor minority rights within its own member state territories reinforces the suggestion that minority rights protection is only a pre-accession criteria. Thirdly, there appears to be no consensus on what constitutes a minority. In the case of some incumbent EU member states, such as France and Greece, official minorities do not exist as everyone is considered to be a French or Greek citizen, explaining why they have so far failed to sign up to or ratify the 1995 COE ‘Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’. Many of these states also argue that because EU membership imposes the need to prevent discrimination and ensure adherence to fundamental human rights, there is no need for explicit ‘minority rights’ legislation.

Taking these three issues into consideration, in addition to the fact the EU accession and Hungary’s adoption of the Schengen acquis also creates quite specific problems for Hungarian societal security it appears strange that Hungary should view the EU as an important player with regard to long-term societal security provision. However, the EU remains an ever increasingly important element within Hungary’s societal security provision strategy.

The European Union and Hungarian Societal Security Provision

Hungary is quite specific about how the EU benefits its societal security. One of its earliest arguments refers to the fact that EU membership for Hungary and its neighbouring states allows Hungary’s borders to become spiritualised, thus healing, albeit metaphorically, the legacy of Trianon.24 The

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24 Interview with Author, 11 November 2002, Budapest.
removal of internal borders within the EU and the creation of what is effectively a ‘borderless community of states’ in which EU citizenship supercedes the ‘existing limitations’ of various CEECs citizenships will, it is argued, allow for the virtual reunification of the Hungarian nation within the context of European citizenship (Csergo & Goldgeier 2001, p.76). As such, Hungary clearly promotes EU integration as a means of unifying the Hungarian nation. It noted within its ‘Renewed Nation Policy’ (Article 1.3) that ‘the central idea of the nation policy pursued by the Government includes the unification of the Hungarian nation in a European Union perspective…’.\(^{25}\) There is, however, a problem with the idea of spiritualised borders and the reunification of the Hungarian nation within the EU; not all countries with ethnic-Hungarian populations have joined the EU along with Hungary: so far, only Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia and, most recently, Romania, have become EU members. Croatia has not as yet been given a date of possible entry, Serbia continues association negotiations, and will be unable to apply for membership or begin accession negotiations until the political status of Kosovo is resolved and Ukraine, while having made overtures regarding possible membership, is unlikely to apply for, let alone be granted, membership in the near future. Therefore, Trianon borders remain and are, in part, reinforced as a result of EU membership. Hungary, nevertheless, continues to support Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine in terms of their EU integration as a means to achieve the virtual reunification of the Hungarian nation in the long-term.\(^{26}\)

A second element of Hungary’s nation policy has been to promote minority rights as a means to ensure societal security for ethnic-Hungarians. This reflects EU attitudes towards minority rights, as a means of preventing societal security threats from escalating into violent conflict. At the same time, Hungary is keen that societal security provision should positively impact on the protection of Hungarian identity and culture throughout the Carpathian Basin and minority rights also plays a role in ensuring this. Therefore, under the premise of leading by example, Hungary was quick to introduce support for its own ethnic minority citizens in the early 1990s. As such, it developed a significant institutional framework to protect the interests of its various ethnic minorities and promote their cultural and educational autonomy (EC 2002, p.30). In 1990, Hungary established the ‘Office for


\(^{26}\) ‘Article III.2.2’, _The National Security Strategy_, for full details see footnote 1.
National and Ethnic Minorities within Hungary’, which is now division of the Department of National and Ethnic Minorities and Nation Policy within the Prime Minister’s Office. In 1993 it also introduced the ‘Law on Representation of National and Ethnic Minorities’, which was updated in 2005. Hungary’s moves to introduce specific standards in minority rights, pre-date the imposition by the EU of any such requirement. This goes some way towards debunking the argument that minority rights protection in Central and Eastern Europe is solely a top-down policy transfer development. At the same time this does not mean that the EU and other international organisations have not had an impact; the inclusion of minority rights in the Copenhagen Criteria, for example, undoubtedly influenced the development of minority rights protection across Central and Eastern Europe. Organisations such as the COE and the OSCE have also stressed the need for all European states, including CEECs, to introduce support for ethnic minorities. For example, the 1995 COE ‘Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ (FCNM) was specifically designed as a ‘legally binding multilateral instrument devoted to the protection of national minorities in general and makes clear that this protection is an integral part of the protection of human rights’ (COE 2001, p. 58). Hungary has been very supportive of the move by these organisations to promote minority rights and, in the early days of the post-Cold War period, it regarded its membership of these organisations as a tactical means through which to pressurise neighbouring states into adopting ‘European norms’ by granting rights to their relevant minorities, which obviously included Hungarians. Hungary has continued to use political norms and terminology (particularly those common to the EU such as regionalism, devolution and subsidiarity) in order to argue for the right to local and regional self-government for Hungarian minorities. This can be witnessed within the following two abstracts from Hungarian Government policy documents:

Hungary supports the concept, according to which Hungarians living in neighbouring countries must enjoy forms of self-government and autonomy that best fit their particular situation and the rights deriving from them, in accordance with European practice…27

The European integration of our region helps minority communities to live more and more with the means of self-government in numerous areas. Such means and forms, providing a

27 ‘Article III.2.2’, The National Security Strategy, for full details see footnote 1.
framework for autonomous community existence, include the decentralisation of public administration, self-government, and the application of the basic European principle of subsidiarity. European examples show that autonomy is an efficient means and context of the co-existence of different peoples.\textsuperscript{28}

The problem for Hungary is that by promoting autonomy for certain regions of neighbouring states in terms of the ‘decentralisation of public administration’, ‘self-government’ and ‘subsidiarity’, it adopts a political rhetoric that challenges the sovereignty of those neighbouring countries. For Romania, this is particularly significant because of its centralised system of government and the fear that the granting of autonomy would lead to the separation of regions such as Transylvania. Such fears can also be found in Slovakia, a young country with a living memory of its own autonomy within the Republic of Czechoslovakia eventually leading to independence. While this may suggest that, at least in the cases of Romania and Slovakia, the issues of ‘autonomy’ and ‘territorial separation’ are one and the same thing, it also highlights the fact that Hungary’s nation policy, as a means of societal security provision, cannot be viewed as purely a cultural concern and is intrinsically linked to political issues. Such issues heighten sensitivities in political relations between Hungary and its neighbours, and reinforce the importance of societal security within the context of Hungarian foreign policy.

Hungary’s attitude regarding the benefits of complying with political norms at a European level can be clearly observed by its actions during the 2002-2003 European Convention on the Future of Europe, held to draw up the ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (Constitutional Treaty). During this convention, Hungary consistently championed the cause of minority rights, declaring that the protection of minority rights within the EU did not go far enough.\textsuperscript{29} This claim took some of the older members of the EU, such as France and Greece, and some of Hungary’s fellow accession states, such as Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia, by surprise, since they thought minority rights, as an aspect of fundamental human rights, were fully covered by the inclusion of the CFREU in the treaty. For Hungary, the problem lay in the fact that the European norm of minority protection (as established in the Copenhagen Criteria) was vaguely defined and had not been applied to those states which were

\textsuperscript{28} ‘Article 4.4’, Hungary’s Renewed Nation Policy, for full details see footnote 25.

already EU members, leading to the creation of a double standard. For example, although the EU had incorporated the Copenhagen Criteria into Article 6 of the 1997 ‘Treaty on European Union’ (Amsterdam), it had removed the reference to ‘respect for and protection of minorities’. Furthermore, although the Article 21.1 of the CFREU, adopted at Nice in December 2000, acknowledged national minorities in the context of non-discrimination (EC 2000b, p.13) it did not contain any specific minority clause.

This lack of a minority clause was reflected in the early drafts of the Constitutional Treaty which did not make reference to minorities. In the draft dated 18 July 2003, Article 2, which relates to the EU’s values, states: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’ (EC 2003, p.5). According to Drzewicki (2005, p.20), this conveyed the impression that ‘the minority clause served as a specific requirement only during the accession procedure’ and, that after the enlargement, ‘the EU no longer considered it worthwhile to call attention to [the minority clause]’. This was of concern to Hungary, which continued to stress the need to ensure that the Constitutional Treaty should include a reference to the rights of national and ethnic minorities as a common European value, separate from the reference to non-discrimination of minorities as detailed in the CFREU. All of Hungary’s representatives within the Convention, regardless of political affiliation, called for the inclusion of minority rights in the basic text of the final draft Constitution. Additionally, Fidesz representative, József Szájer, called for the establishment of an advisory Committee of National and Ethnic Minorities to be similar in composition to the existing Economic and Social Committee or the European Committee of the Regions. Although this proposal was not included in the final draft Constitution, a reference to minority rights was included, but only after the then Hungarian Prime Minister, Péter Medgyessy, raised the issue as a bargaining concern at the European Council Summit of June 2004 which had come together to finalise the treaty.30 Article I.2 of the final draft Constitution, dated 25 June 2004, detailing the EU’s values states that ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ [emphasis added] (EC 2004, p.15). The inclusion of the reference to ‘the rights of persons

belonging to minorities’ means that there would be (dependant upon ratification of the Constitutional Treaty) an established, legal and binding precedent for ethnic and minority rights to which all current and future EU members would have to abide. As Sasse (2005, p.687) notes, the inclusion of minority rights in Article I.2 of the draft Constitutional Treaty, ‘anchors the first Copenhagen criterion, including the “minority condition”, in EU law’.

With the failure of the Constitutional Treaty to be ratified following the French and Dutch referendums, the legality of the inclusion of minority rights within EU law remains academic. However, the potential for this legal dimension remains important. Hungary has been quick to recognise the benefits of a legal reference to minority rights within the EU’s acquis for the promotion of societal security for the Hungarian nation. As such it has continued to argue for the inclusion of a reference to the protection for minority rights within the upcoming Reform Treaty which is designed to replace the failed Constitutional Treaty and is due to be finalised at the European Council Summit in December 2007.31 This is considered all the more important for Hungary following the recommendation at the June 2007 European Council Summit, which stated that although the CFREU would become legally binding under the application of EU law, it would not be officially attached to the new treaty (as it had been to the Constitutional Treaty) thus allowing member states the right to opt-out of implementing the CFREU. As of July 2007 the UK, Ireland and Poland have stated that they would exercise this opt-out option. Therefore it is extremely important for Hungary that a reference to minority rights be included within the text of the treaty and which would be legally binding on all EU member states. The inclusion of a reference to minority rights within EU law provides Hungary with an alternative and more powerful legal mechanism than more traditional methods of ensuring societal security for the wider Hungarian nation, such as bi-lateral treaties.

The promotion of minority rights as a fundamental value of the EU and its inclusion within any future EU treaty development is not just a matter of legal wording for Hungary; it also raises awareness of minority affairs at the EU level, something which Hungary has been keen to capitalise on as a means to further its nation policy. An example of this is the way in which Hungary has dealt with the societal security problems facing its kin-nationals living in Vojvodina (Serbia) and Slovakia.

Although Hungary has shown its willingness to promote EU membership for Serbia, it has also not been afraid to utilise its position as a new EU member state with a veto on the accession of future members and an influence over the association process for candidate states as a bargaining tool to enhance the position of ethnic-Hungarians in Vojvodina. This was observed in September 2004, when Hungary threatened to use its EU membership to disrupt association negotiations with the then State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. László Kovács, then Foreign Minister of Hungary, commented on Radio Kossuth (10 September 2004) that ‘the stability of Serbia-Montenegro’ is in the interest of the entire EU, but that ‘the promise of a union perspective’ [EU membership] should be tied to ‘conditions’. These conditions, he continued, could go beyond cooperation with the International Criminal Court in The Hague and also include guaranteeing the rights of minorities. This was a specific reference to the rights of the ethnic-Hungarian minority of Vojvodina. ‘Attacks on Hungarians’, he continued, ‘were not just a violation of human and minority rights but were also a threat to the stability of the entire region’. This view was also noted in a press release from the Hungarian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, quoted in Népszabadság, which said that ‘the improvement of the situation of minorities in Serbia affects the entire European community’. The then Hungarian Prime Minister, Petér Medgyessy, formally asked the EU and NATO to do all they could ‘to prevent attacks on Hungarians in Vojvodina’. Additionally, Kovács briefed fellow European foreign ministers on the situation and tabled a motion to be voted on by the Council to send monitors to the region and to press Serbia for greater minority rights. Within the European Parliament, a number of initiatives were tabled by Hungarian MEPs, including Kinga Gál and George Schöpflin. On 16 September 2004, the European Parliament approved a ‘Joint Motion for a Resolution on the Harassment of Minorities in Vojvodina’, which stated that the European Parliament had deep concerns


33 see footnote 32.

34 Népszabadság, 8 September 2004, p.3.

35 ‘Hungary to raise issue of ethnic violence in Serbia at EU meeting’, AFP Newswire Report, 8 September 2004, available via EU Business at:


36 see footnote 34.
about repeated breaches of human rights in the province of Vojvodina and called on the governments of the Republic of Serbia and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to acknowledge abuses against ethnic-Hungarians as criminal acts.\textsuperscript{37} It was also clearly outlined in the Joint Motion that ‘observance of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human and minority rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law is one of the basic principles of the Stabilisation and Association Process and a prerequisite for their [State Union of Serbia and Montenegro] future relationship with the EU’. In addition, the European Parliament called for a fact-finding mission to the Vojvodina which would report back to the Foreign Affairs Committee and its Subcommittee on Human Rights and requested that the Council of the European Union and the European Commission ‘closely monitor developments in Vojvodina’ and ‘use the EU’s political leverage to raise this issue with all authorities in the Republic of Serbia and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro’.\textsuperscript{38}

In response to the request of Kovács and the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, albeit cautiously, requested the Commission Delegation in Belgrade to observe the extent of the ethnic-minority incidents in Vojvodina. This it did and on 11 October 2005 the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, in a speech before the Vojvodina Provincial Assembly stated that if Serbia continued to allow violation of human and minority rights in Vojvodina that the EU could suspend its Stabilisation and Association Agreement.\textsuperscript{39} In September 2006, Doris Pack, head of the European Parliament Delegation for Southeast Europe also noted that while she supported moves


\textsuperscript{38} see footnote 37.

by the Serbian government to grant increased autonomy for Kosovo, it could not negate the need for the wider decentralisation of Serbia including granting Vojvodina autonomy.40

What is significant about these developments is that they essentially internationalise or ‘EU-ise’ an ethnic minority issue; something which traditionally the EU has been cautious about doing. Beyond the reference to minority rights within the Copenhagen Criteria (which concerns candidate states only), the EU has generally regarded incidents involving ethnic-minorities to be the domestic concern of its individual member states. When the EU had previously made reference within declarations about a minority rights related issues it was generally directed towards those countries which were either already members or candidates for membership. In this instance, Serbia is not, as yet, a member or an official candidate for EU membership, although it is recognised as a potential candidate for membership.41 As such, Serbia is not legally required to adhere to the EU prerequisites and demands for minority rights as imposed on candidate countries via the Copenhagen Criteria. For the EU to acknowledge these incidents and to press a non-EU candidate state to make political moves in the field of minority rights (as opposed to more general fundamental rights) is an unprecedented development.

By using the EU in this way, Hungary shows that it is capable of astute political strategy because by involving the EU it is possible that certain conditions (even if these are not legally binding) could be imposed upon a country such as Serbia. This is important because a candidate or potential candidate country could risk its own financial and political future by choosing to ignore these conditions. This was neatly explained in an editorial of the Hungarian daily newspaper, Népszabadság, which commented, following the institutional warnings from the EU to Serbia about its possible future candidature for EU membership: "the major part of Serbian politics and the Serbian public might be finally made to understand that they have two choices: “Europe”, in which case the country must grant


41 A state is formally considered to be a candidate for EU membership only once it has officially applied to join the EU and the EU has agreed to accept it as a future member dependant on their adoption of and adherence to the EU’s body of law – acquis communautaire. Formal accession negotiations do not need to have opened. As of January 2007 the only official candidates for EU membership are Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia.
democratic rights to its citizens representing non-Serbian ethnic groups, or ethnic “purity”, in which case Serbia will cut itself off from the political continent.\(^{42}\) It appears that for Hungary the EU is just as important for securing minority rights, within the context of its nation policy, as more traditional minority rights led organisations such as the Council of Europe or the promotion of bi-lateral treaties.

Hungary does not just use the EU as a way to enhance the societal security of ethnic-Hungarians living beyond the borders in non-EU states; it also actively uses the EU and the EU’s policies and institutions to influence the political and societal security of ethnic-Hungarians within EU countries (Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania). This has been particularly relevant with regard to Slovakia. As with the case of Vojvodina, the Hungarian press and politicians condemned a series of highly publicised attacks on ethnic-Hungarians in Slovakia during the summer of 2006, following the June 2006 governmental coalition between the centre-left, Direction - Social Democracy Party (SMER), headed by Robert Fico and the ultra-nationalist, Slovak National Party (SNS), headed by Ján Slota. The SNS and its leader have been known actively to encourage anti-Hungarian sentiment. This coalition has caused concern for the EU due to its similarity to the Austrian coalition of 2000 between the Christian Democratic, People’s Party, and far-right Freedom Party. However, unlike with Austria, individual EU member states have been more cautious about instigating sanctions against Slovakia. This has not, however, stopped the Hungarian government and European Parliament representatives within both the European People’s Party (EPP) and Party of European Socialists (PES) from raising the problem of anti-Hungarian attacks, which they claim are linked to the inclusion of the SNS in the Slovak coalition. In August 2006 the chairman of the PES, Poul Nyrrup Rasmussen, reiterated this Hungarian position and assured Hungary of the PES’s support with regard to this situation.\(^{43}\) The Hungarian position was also reflected within the European Commission when Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, commented following a meeting on 7 September 2007 with Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, that the European Commission would carefully monitor the situation of ethnic-Hungarians in Slovakia.\(^{44}\) On 12 October 2006 the PES officially suspended SMER on the grounds

\(^{42}\) Népszabadság, 17 September 2004, p.3.


that PES member parties should ‘refrain from any form of political alliance or co-operation at all levels with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred’.

While the suspension specifically refers to the Slovak coalition, it is the active anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic and anti-Roma sentiments of the SNS, as the junior coalition partner, and not SMER that is the real concern.

**Political Implications for Hungary**

Hungary’s successful attempt to provide societal security for the wider Hungarian nation by ensuring the ‘EU-isation’ of, for example, the situation of ethnic-Hungarians in Vojvodina or Slovakia does have potential repercussions, particularly with regard to maintaining good relations with its neighbouring countries. Serbia has not been happy with Hungary’s involvement in issues which it regards as isolated domestic issues. Serbian Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, has stated that the inter-ethnic incidents in Vojvodina ‘do not amount to a justification for internationalisation’, which ‘can only harm all those who live in Vojvodina and unnecessarily disrupt the good relations between Serbia-Montenegro and Hungary’.

Relations between Hungary and Slovakia have also begun to sour, as could be seen by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány’s refusal to meet with his Slovakian counterpart, Robert Fico, at the 15th Anniversary Summit of the Visegrád countries. Ironically, the Visegrád initiative was established to aid cooperation and dialogue between its four members, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. This creates a significant political dilemma for Hungary. By using the EU as a ‘political tool’ to further its own nation policy agenda, Hungary potentially creates problems by aggravating its neighbouring states, thereby compromising its own Hungarian premier in row with Slovak cabinet’, Kossuth Radio, 30 August 2006, BBC Monitoring Service, 30 August 2006.


triple-priority foreign policy. This reflects the dilemma faced by Antall in the early 1990s and suggests that Hungary cannot always balance its triple-priority foreign policy. The 2004-2005 Vojvodina and 2006 Slovak situations clearly highlight cases where the issue of kin-nationals has taken priority. Yet despite this evidence of an unequal balance between Euro-Atlantic integration, good neighbourly relations and nation policy, they remain central to how Hungarian foreign policy is formulated. As such, Hungary continues to promote the EU as a way to benefit both its neighbourhood policy and, most importantly, its nation policy. It also continues to promote its neighbourhood policy as a means to enhance the European integration of the region and to secure benefits for kin-nationals. Furthermore, it continues to promote the situation of kin-nationals as a means to encourage dialogue and action on a regional basis and at the wider European and Atlantic level.

The political dilemma facing Hungary in terms of balancing its foreign policy objectives is paralleled by a dilemma in terms of the way Hungary views societal security. There is (1) an undoubted rhetorical commitment which forces the Hungarian government to deal with the issue of the Hungarian diaspora; (2) a genuine concern for the societal security of the Hungarian nation in terms of the survival of Hungarian culture and language throughout traditionally settled Hungarian territories and (3) a rational concern about the financial capability of the Hungarian state successfully to cope with immigration of ethnic-Hungarians from beyond the borders. This explains the recent move by the Hungarian government to support these people directly by encouraging them to remain in their traditional homelands by providing them with funding for cultural development projects, and indirectly through the promotion of the political and economic development of neighbouring states. This, in theory, raises living standards and lowers the likelihood of political or economic migration into Hungary. The reality for Hungary, as a result of certain historical as well as current societal, political and economic factors, is that it is placed in a difficult situation vis-à-vis the co-ordination of central governmental policies, both foreign and domestic.

Political Implications for the European Union

Hungary’s promotion of its nation policy creates obvious political difficulties in terms of balancing its foreign policy objectives, but it also creates, albeit indirectly, something of a political dilemma for the EU. As already stated, the EU and its incumbent member states have traditionally argued that societal security concerns should be seen as a domestic issue which should be dealt with at the national, not
supranational, level. However, with EU eastern enlargement and the development of the Copenhagen Criteria, which made specific reference to the protection of minorities, the EU inadvertently opened the door for new member states such as Hungary to use the various EU institutions to successfully promote minority rights as a societal security concern. This has forced the EU to elevate the protection of minority rights to that of a fundamental EU value beyond that associated with adherence to the Copenhagen Criteria during the accession process. This has the potential to impact on the EU in two ways. Firstly, it could result in the EU legislating actual policy on EU-wide minority rights in the future. Even if references to minority rights are limited in nature, such as being referenced in an official statement of values of the EU, the implications this could have for the EU remain significant, particularly when it is considered that the interpretation of EU legislation by the European Court of Justice has often led to the rapid development of certain policy areas. For some EU member states with large minority populations, such as France, Spain, Germany and the UK, this would likely be an unwelcome development. Secondly, even if specific legislation is not produced, the EU could still find that it is forced to uphold minority rights as a common EU value across all of its member states, not just the new ones. Interestingly, it is the new member states, such as Hungary, Poland and Estonia that are holding the EU to task on this issue. For example, just as the EU has an ‘implied’ military security benefit, whereby other EU members would come to the aid of a member state which had been attacked, the promotion of minority and ethnic rights at the EU level creates an ‘implied’ societal security benefit. This ‘implied’ societal security benefit means that the EU should come to the aid of a member state who felt that its kin-nationals were under threat. This is significant because major societal security problems can be found throughout all of the EU’s new and future member states, from the Baltic States to the Balkans. There is nothing to stop any new member state from looking to the EU for support to combat perceived societal security threats. Should the EU fail to provide this support, then there could be potentially serious repercussions, not only for relations between EU members, but also for relations between the EU and third parties.

Evidence of this danger can be observed with regard to relations between the EU and Poland, Belarus and Russia. Poland has turned to the EU for support with regard to the situation of the 400,000 ethnic-Poles living in Belarus, where Polish-language journalists and political activists have been jailed and the Union of Poles, an organisation mainly concerning cultural activities, has been banned. In July 2005, following a pre-dawn raid by Belarus riot police on a building belonging to the Union of Poles,
Poland withdrew its Ambassador to Belarus and urged the EU to impose sanctions, including a travel ban.⁴⁸ Poland has also sought support from the EU over Russian actions on a number of political, economic and societal issues. These societal concerns followed a number of attacks on Polish workers following the mugging in August 2005 of three teenage dependants of Russian diplomats in Warsaw.⁴⁹ Russia, claiming that Poland maintains a sense of Russophobia, demanded an apology (Lucas 2005, p.12). The failure of Poland to provide this apology, claiming that the Warsaw incident was an unfortunate crime, but not ethnically related, resulted in more Polish Embassy officials and journalists being attacked in Moscow. To date, the EU has not come to Poland’s support over either Belarus or Russia in terms of societal differences. This suggests that there may be a sense of uneasiness on the part of the EU about the extent to which it should get involved in emotive issues of identity and nationality. This uneasiness was reinforced when Estonia sought EU support following the ‘Bronze Soldier’ riots and cyber attacks in Estonia and blockade of the Estonian Embassy in Moscow during April and May 2007. Although, these security challenges were the direct result of ethnic-Russian annoyance at the Estonian government’s relocation of a Second World War memorial statute of a Red Army solider and the bones of Russian soldiers from a site in the city centre of Tallinn to a military cemetery, they represent a physical demonstration of the security challenges stemming from societal divisions between ethnic-Estonians and the ethnic-Russian population within Estonia, supported by the Russian state. The EU did eventually issue a declaration of solidarity with Estonia, but it was slow to react and was essentially forced to comment due to the high degree of global media coverage the Estonian events had received and the politically sensitive timing of the riots in advance of the 2007 EU/Russia summit.⁵⁰ If societal security problems, such as those witnessed by Hungary, Poland and

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⁴⁹ Moscow Times, 16 August 2005, p.4.

Estonia, continue to increase, particularly for other CEE members of the EU, then this uneasiness on the part of the EU to react with conviction to the societal security threats faced by its new members could damage relations between the EU and those new members who seek, and indeed, demand support and solidarity on societal security concerns. If this were to happen, the political cost to the EU could be high.

**Conclusion**

The division of security into sectors, as advocated by the Copenhagen School, is explained by Wæver (1999, p.335) as ‘an analytical net to trawl through the existing security discourses to register what is going on’. There is justification for using such a method to examine EU eastern enlargement, particularly as sectors are already commonly used to explain rationales for enlargement along, for example, economic or political lines. In short, analysts make judgements and draw conclusions based on empirical data and the sectors or conceptual lenses through which the data is examined. The problem with this is that if the lenses are limited then the findings will also be limited. This problem is reflected within EU eastern enlargement literature. By expanding the number of sectors or lenses through which data is examined then a more nuanced picture can be developed and the analyst’s understanding of that picture can become more comprehensive.

In the case of Hungary, societal security for the Hungarian nation is proven to be a significant rationale for enlargement. As is shown in this article, it is important to recognise such rationales because they do have very specific political implications. For Hungary this is definitely the case because by using the EU and EU enlargement as a means to force neighbouring states to provide certain rights for ethnic-Hungarian minorities, it, albeit indirectly, risks destabilising political relations with its neighbours and potentially creates greater difficulties for the Hungarian diaspora. This suggests that Hungary may never find a way of balancing its triple priority foreign policy to promote Euro-Atlantic integration, good neighbourly relations and support for ethnic-Hungarians living outside Hungary.

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By utilising the EU within a societal security context Hungary also helps to create a particular political dilemma for the EU and its member states by promoting national and ethnic minority rights at the European level. This political dilemma can be observed in two ways: firstly, it increases the potential for the EU to become directly involved within various political disputes over issues relating to national and ethnic identity, something that the EU has been traditionally reluctant to do. These disputes can be between EU member states and third countries, such as the dispute between Hungary and Serbia following the anti-Hungarian attacks in Vojvodina, or the dispute between Estonia and Russia following the ‘Bronze Soldier’ riots and embassy blockade. They can also be between two EU member states, such as the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia following the creation of the SMER-SNS coalition. Secondly, it increases the likelihood that the EU will develop specific policy that will ensure societal issues, such as minority rights, are protected under EU law. Such a development will have implications for all EU members, particularly those older member states which have large migrant ethnic and/or indigenous national minority populations such as the UK, Spain and Germany, or those that have traditionally refused to recognise minority populations as constituent entities in their own right, such as France or Greece.

Eastern enlargement has not only opened the EU to new members but it has increased the opportunity for these new members to influence policy development at the EU level in a bottom-up manner. This shows that EU eastern enlargement has not only resulted in top-down policy transfer from old to new member states. Hungary’s attempt to enhance its societal security through European integration by ensuring that minority rights are recognised as a fundamental European value and written into EU legal text is an example of this bottom-up dimension. With future eastern and south-eastern enlargement likely, it is possible that other states with their own societal security concerns will join Hungary to force the EU to further address the national and ethnic identity issues of its new and old member states. If the EU fails to make real and meaningful policy decisions on this matter then the political implications would be significant because the EU will be exposed as lacking in political solidarity and a weak and ineffective guardian of a value which it upholds, through the Copenhagen Criteria, as necessary for membership; namely respect for and protection of minorities, which is itself a fundamental component of the national interest concern that is societal security.

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References


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**TABLE 1**


<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Transylvania</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Vojvodina</th>
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<td>5,400,000</td>
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Source: Government Office of Hungarian Minorities Abroad, available at: